A FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF NATIONS
Eric T. Laity
This Article proposes a conceptual foundation for the field of international tax
law. The Article refers to this foundation as the institutional competence of nations in
global economic development. A nation’s institutional competence is its discretion to
make decisions in pursuit of our collective goal of global economic development,
discretion that is subject to a number of standards and limitations.
The Article constructs the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development from institutional economics, simple game theory, and the literature on
social norms. The Article expresses the institutional competence of nations through
standards and limitations that reduce the abuse of sovereign discretion and address
international collective action problems in the pursuit of global economic development.
These standards and limitations allocate prescriptive jurisdiction among nations over the
global income tax base.
The foundation proposed by the Article would coordinate international taxation
with the international regulation of trade. The Article also addresses the proper place of
capital export neutrality in the hierarchy of values for economic development, the choice
between territorial and worldwide tax systems, the evaluation of tax havens and
appropriate responses, the use of anti-deferral regimes, and the possible need for a
multilateral tax treaty.
On this institutional foundation, the role of the state is both essential and
subordinate: sovereignty becomes an instrumental value and national law-making is
seen in terms of a conceptual subsidiarity, to use the European term, or a
consequentialist federalism in the realm of global economic development. Moreover,
non-state actors facilitate sovereign competition and the benefits that such a constraint
on the abuse of sovereign discretion brings to the world’s people.
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A FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF NATIONS
Eric T. Laity*
“How is the cooperation of these vast numbers of people in countries all over the
world, which is necessary for even a modest standard of living, to be brought about?”1
INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes a conceptual foundation for the field of international tax
law. The Article refers to this foundation as the institutional competence of nations in
global economic development. A nation’s institutional competence is its discretion to
make decisions in pursuit of our collective goal of global economic development,
discretion that is subject to a number of standards and limitations.
The Article begins with an analogy. Consider the manager of a complex
organization. In order to obtain the best results, the manager must delegate decisionmaking authority to others. Furthermore, the delegation of decision-making authority
must be accompanied by a grant of autonomy to the subordinate decision-makers, if the
manager hopes to receive the full benefit of delegating decision-making authority.
Unfortunately, subordinate decision-makers can abuse their discretion.
Subordinates might depart from the organization’s goal and pursue their own objectives,
possibly exploiting individuals under their control along the way. Furthermore,
subordinates might attempt to shift their costs onto the budgets of other subordinate
decision-makers. To minimize the abuse of discretion, the manager must create standards
and limitations within which subordinate decision-makers are to exercise their autonomy.
The delegation of decision-making authority to multiple subordinates also creates
collective action problems for those subordinates. Hence, the manager of the complex
organization must encourage the development of social norms that coordinate collective
action within the organization.
We can summarize the task of the manager of a complex organization. The
manager must set the organization’s overall goal. The manager must delegate decisionmaking authority and autonomy to subordinates within the organization. And, finally, the
*
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manager must create a decisional environment for those subordinates. The decisional
environment consists of standards and limitations to minimize the abuse of delegated
discretion and of social norms to coordinate the subordinates’ collective action.
We can draw an analogy from the complex organization to the community of
nations. Of course, we have no actual manager for the community of nations. We must
posit a hypothetical manager and, following the lead of constitutional theory, we might
refer to the world’s people as the original source of authority for the community of
nations. Assume that the goal our hypothetical manager has set for the community of
nations is to improve our well-being. Assume, too, that some level of global economic
development is necessary to provide the material basis for our well-being.
The nations of the world become the subordinate decision-makers to whom the
world’s people have delegated authority and autonomy. Nations are to use their authority
and autonomy to pursue the goal of improving our well-being and, in particular, to pursue
some measure of global economic development.
Under the analogy, we must create a decisional environment for the world’s
nations that would allow us to benefit from decentralized decision-making while reducing
its drawbacks. The decisional environment would consist, in part, of standards and
limitations that curb the abuse of sovereign discretion. The decisional environment must
also include the international equivalent of social norms that alleviate collective action
problems among nations. This decisional environment defines the institutional
competence of nations, an institutional competence that aligns the decisions of nations
with our objective. When we shape the international decisional environment, we engage
in the institutional design of nations.
This Article engages in the institutional design of nations by proposing a
decisional environment that would align national decisions about taxation with the goal
of global economic development. The Article’s objective is to gain the benefits of
decentralized decision-making for the world’s economy, while reducing the drawbacks.
The Article assumes that the ultimate goals of the world’s people require a measure of
global economic development for their realization.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the basic idea of the institutional
competence of nations in global economic development. Part II describes the importance
of using multiple sovereign decision-makers for global economic development. Part III
addresses the abuse of sovereign discretion. It develops standards for and limitations on
national decision-making about economic development, especially those applicable to the
design of the international provisions of national income tax codes. Part IV deals with
international collective action problems in global economic development, particularly
those in international taxation. International social norms, such as the proposed standards
and limitations, are the chief means for the coordination of national decision-making in
pursuit of global economic development. Secondary norms aimed at key interest groups
would enforce the standards and limitations. Part V gives a summary of the Article’s
implications for international tax law.
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I. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF NATIONS IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
There are, of course, multiple nations in the world. There is value to global
economic development in having multiple decision-makers. We can recognize some of
that value by recalling the benefits to be derived from the delegation of decision-making
authority to others. We might view the matter as a delegation of decision-making
authority over global economic development by the world’s people to the nations of the
world.
Nations use some of their decision-making authority to craft environments for the
economic development of their people. Those environments include property rights,
markets, the rule of law, enabling law for privately created organizations, a bankruptcy
regime, decentralized decision-making, competition, regulatory regimes, public
infrastructure, an educated and healthy workforce, the provision of public goods and
services, and various burdens including taxation and fees.2 Nations shape their economic
environments for at least two reasons: to influence the decision-making of enterprises in
favor of economic development and to enhance their tax revenue.
A nation also uses its decision-making authority to determine the optimal size of
its public sector. The size of a nation’s public sector is intertwined with its economic
development.3 The revenue needs of a public sector affect the rate at which its economy
grows. The tax burden on an economy necessarily limits the rate of capital formation, an
essential ingredient in economic development. In this sense, the size of a nation’s public
sector is part of the nation’s economic environment. If a nation’s economy grows,
however, the nation’s increased tax receipts permit an increase in the activities of its
public sector. In this sense, a nation’s economic development is subordinate to the longterm goals of its public sector.
A nation has a third decision to make from time to time concerning economic
development. A nation must determine the distribution of the transition costs to higher
standards of living. Although economic development raises standards of living for a
population, the distribution of the benefit can be uneven; some members of the
population may actually be worse off after the change to a higher overall standard of
2

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 81
(1990) (describing institutional characteristics that are crucial to effective organization). Oliver Williamson
calls adaptation the central problem of economic organization. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS
OF GOVERNANCE 327 (1995). A government must create the conditions under which transactions will be
aligned with modes of organization in light of their adaptive needs and capacities. See id. For vibrant
development, nations must also offer credible commitments against expropriation of investment and an
independent judiciary to enforce hybrid modes of governance created by the private sector. Id. at 330-333.
Both are required if a nation is to attract high-value intangibles. Id. at 332-333.
3

Douglass North characterizes the size of a nation’s public sector as one of the three most important keys
to economic performance in the modern world. The other two keys are property rights and government
regulation. NORTH, supra note 2, at 112.
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living. The nation must determine the distribution of such a detriment within that
population.
There are two hazards in the delegation of decision-making. The first hazard is
the decision-maker’s abuse of its discretion to make decisions. We must limit a decisionmaker’s exercise of discretion if we are to reach the goal for which we have delegated
decision-making authority.
The abuse of discretion can take several forms. A decision-maker can pursue
goals other than the one for which it has been delegated decision-making authority. This
form of abuse generates agency costs for the superior decision-maker.4 A decision-maker
can also use its discretion to exploit subordinate actors. Such exploitation gives rise to a
redistribution of wealth to actors who have captured the decision-making process.5
Thirdly, a decision-maker can take advantage of incomplete bargaining with other
decision-makers on the same plane of authority, encumbering those decision-makers with
externalities.6 Such opportunism can reduce the aggregate welfare of the people for
whom the decision-makers are responsible.
We can limit the abuse of sovereign discretion by specifying standards for and
limitations on the economic environments created by sovereign decision-makers.
Examples of those standards and limitations might include democratic accountability for
the sovereign decision-maker and a code of human rights. Competition among
sovereigns in the design of their economic environments serves as another limitation on
their exploitation of subordinate actors. One of the benefits of having multiple decisionmakers on the same plane of authority is the competition that is then possible.
The second hazard in the delegation of decision-making is the creation of
collective action problems. This hazard is distinctive to the delegation of discretion to
multiple decision-makers on the same plane of authority. There may be desirable global
states of affairs that nations cannot reach through their individual efforts due to their
inability to coordinate their decision-making.
We can address collective action problems through the standards and limitations
we set on sovereign decision-making for economic development. An example of those
standards and limitations is a ban on export subsidies. Thus, the standards and limitations
on the design of a nation’s economic environment address both abuses of sovereign
discretion and collective action problems. To the extent that they address externalities
and collective action problems, the standards and limitations serve as a set of property
rights for sovereign decision-makers.
4
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Without a central authority to enact into law the standards and limitations we
devise for national decision-making about economic development, those standards and
limitations can only be the international equivalent of social norms. Furthermore,
without a central authority, the standards and limitations can only be enforced through
social norms of punishment. A sovereign failing to respect the standards and limitations
on economic decision-making would subject itself to different treatment by other
sovereigns. The international norms of punishment would specify the measured
retaliation permitted in such an event.
Thus, the standards and limitations on a sovereign’s decision-making about
economic development would be of two kinds: a primary set of standards and limitations
applicable to the nation’s relations with other nations that observe those norms, and a
secondary set applicable to the nation’s relations with violators. A nation’s tax code
would have two sets of international provisions: one set applicable to nations in
compliance with the primary norms and another set applicable to others.
We engage in institutional design when we formulate the standards and
limitations governing national decision-making about global economic development.7
When applied to the international provisions of national income tax codes, the standards
and limitations allocate among nations decision-making authority over the global income
tax base. More generally, the standards and limitations allocate among nations the
decision-making authority over global economic development. The standards and
limitations define the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development.
II. THE VALUE OF MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNS
We are engaged in the enterprise of global economic development for the benefit
of the world’s people. If we were starting from scratch, we would have to devise an
environment that would foster economic development, taking into account the optimal
size of the public sector and a fair distribution of transition costs. We would design that
environment to influence the decision-making of individuals and companies in favor of
global economic development. Our task would be easier and the result enhanced if we
were to delegate the matter to multiple independent decision-makers. Each decisionmaker would be responsible for creating a part of the global economic environment. We
might divide the responsibilities by territory and make each decision-maker responsible
for the people living there.
Of course, we are not starting from scratch. There are multiple sovereign
decision-makers in the world, and each is already engaged in crafting an environment for
the economic development of its people. Yet, it is easy to overlook the value of multiple

7

See also HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 1-17 (4th ed. 1997) (designing organizations to
align the decision-making of individuals with the goals of the organization).
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decision-makers in global economic development and push for the unilateral projection
of a single nation’s economic environment throughout the world.
We can see the value of multiple decision-makers in global economic
development if we compare the arrangement to a complex organization with a central
decision-maker. The delegation of decision-making authority by the central decisionmaker improves the organization’s performance.8 The improvement is greater if the
subordinate decision-makers have true autonomy; those subordinate decision-makers
must reap the benefits of their decisions and bear the attendant burdens.9 Externalities
between subordinate decision-makers should be minimized: a decision-maker ought not
to export its costs to another decision-maker, nor to seize the benefits accruing to another
decision-maker. In the analogy to delegation within a complex organization, sovereignty
becomes an instrumental concept based on the benefits to a complex organization of a
grant of autonomy to subordinate decision-makers.
The delegation of decision-making authority to autonomous actors improves the
performance of a complex organization in several ways. First, delegation releases, for the
benefit of the organization, information and action otherwise withheld from the central
decision-maker. There are times when the incentives to withhold private information are
such that the holders of the information must be given the authority to make the decisions
for which such information is required if the organization is to benefit from that
information.10 Even if the information is obtainable by the central decision-maker, it may
be cheaper to delegate the decision-making to a person who already holds the
information. Moreover, subordinates may be unwilling to implement central decisions if
they have not participated in the decisions. Furthermore, the role of ignored or spurned
interest groups in blocking local action or the revelation of local information should not
be overlooked.11
In the case of global economic development, European Union economic policy
gains the benefit of local information and action through the requirement that Union

8

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 77-82. We may draw a parallel to the decentralization theorem of public
economics. Under the theorem, the devolution of authority from a central government to local
governments may increase the likelihood of innovation in public goods and of satisfying residents’
preferences for public goods. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEORGETOWN L.J. 201,
215-16, 261-62 (1997).
9

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 216-221.
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See id. at 139 (“the strategic misrepresentation of hidden information is itself the most profound obstacle
to effective hierarchical performance”).

11

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 106-113 (describing peer pressure within interdependent work groups to
mask the potential productivity of the group); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1991) (the effectiveness of interest groups in blocking proposed legislation) (citing K.
SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317 (1986)).
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directives be implemented through national legislation.12 National legislation can take
local conditions, institutions, and practices into account.
More generally, the
construction of the global economic environment can benefit from local information and
action if the construction is delegated to sovereign decision-makers.
A second benefit of delegation within a complex organization is the promotion of
a variety of approaches to the organization’s overall goal. This variety is due in part to
the release of hidden information and action. The variety is also due to the Bendor effect:
the delegation of authority to multiple independent subordinates improves the likelihood
of generating new approaches to the organization’s ultimate goal.13
In the case of global economic development, delegation would promote a variety
of approaches to the creation of an economic environment conducive to development.
Such variety is valuable to us because it enables us to use the comparative method to
evaluate the efficacy of different economic environments, and, through that method,
partly to overcome our inevitable lack of information about endowments, our inability to
use controlled experiments in the public sphere, and the inevitable incompleteness of
decision-making.14
In a world of perfect information, we would know the distribution of endowments
within a society that would produce, given each individual member’s preferences and
under conditions of perfect competition, the highest standard of living for that society.
We would also know the existing distribution of endowments and thus the changes
needed to achieve the optimal distribution. But, we cannot know the information
necessary to determine or reach the optimal distribution of endowments for a society.15
The members of society have an incentive not to disclose the necessary information to us,
which includes information about their existing endowments. Such information remains
essentially private.
Nor can we run controlled experiments to determine the optimal distribution of
endowments. It’s not politically feasible to redistribute endowments, even on a
12

For the requirement of national implementation of directives, see TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (THE TREATY OF ROME) consolidated version, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION C
340/173 (Nov. 10, 1997), article 249.
13

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 79-80 (citing JONATHAN BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS 47 (1985)).
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The comparative method is championed by transaction cost economics, among other schools.
Transaction cost economics assesses “the comparative efficacy of alternative governance structures for
harmonizing ex post contractual relations.” WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 177; see id. at 93-119. The
comparative method mitigates the difficulty of measuring transaction costs. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21-22 (1985). The choice of institutions for a nation’s economic
environment involves trade-offs, even among efficiency attributes. We need a variety of institutional mixes
for study. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 93-119.
15

See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 36 (1988).
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temporary basis.16 A legislature with fully informed interest groups could not pursue the
redistribution of endowments needed to reach the optimal distribution. Any inducement
a person was paid to agree to the change would have to be counted toward that person’s
ideal starting position. Hence, we would have to lie about the ideal initial distribution of
endowments. Nor could we verify the level of redistributed endowments, because we
cannot determine the pre-existing distribution of endowments. Without determining the
pre-existing distribution of endowments, we could not establish a control group, either.
A variety of approaches to the creation of an economic environment ameliorates
the inevitable incompleteness of decision-making. Decision-makers make incomplete
decisions, but the decisions are incomplete in different ways: decision-making is
bounded by circumstances specific to the decision-maker.17 The alternatives we consider
will be limited to those that we can imagine and further limited, by constraints on our
time and resources, to those alternatives that intuitively seem most useful to analyze.18
The consequences we determine for those alternatives will be limited to those we can
imagine and further limited by our expectations about what the actions of others will be.19
Because the time and information available for making a decision are limited, we must
assume the truth or falsehood of some of the imagined consequences of an alternative.
Our choice among sets of consequences will be limited partly by the sunk costs of our
previous decisions.20 Our choice is more difficult if values are specific to concrete
situations and therefore difficult to anticipate.21 Because decision-making time and
attention are scarce resources, we devise habits, rules, and routines to conserve those
resources.22 Those habits in turn limit the alternatives and consequences we consider. A
decision-maker faced with the demands of rational choice may be tempted to identify
with a group or role to reduce those demands.23
A third benefit of delegation within complex organizations is the competition it
makes possible among decision-makers. The central decision-maker for the organization
sets the terms of competition to encourage decision-makers to adopt the better approaches
devised within the group or to formulate a more promising approach.24 In the case of
16

See id. at 37.

17

See SIMON, supra note 7, at 45-47.

18

See id. at 94, 96-97, 109.

19

See id. at 78, 80-82, 93.

20

See id. at 77-78.

21

See id. at 93, 95-96.

22

See id. at 89.

23

See id. at 280-288.

24

See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 457 (1977) (describing the rise and structure of the
multidivisional firm, with central management evaluating the performance of the firm’s divisions and
allocating capital among the divisions). A multi-divisional company adds to the holding company structure
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global economic development, we would like sovereign decision-makers to adopt the
better approaches to fostering economic development. Competition among nations is an
aid to the diffusion of best practices. There is no central decision-maker setting the terms
of competition, however. In order for sovereign competition to function, constituents
must have the power to choose among national economic environments and the power to
change incumbent officials.25
A fourth benefit of delegation within a complex organization is the improved
decision-making it produces for the organization as a whole when unified action is
needed. The Condorcet jury theory suggests that the alternative chosen by a group of
autonomous decision-makers among the alternatives available will be better than the
selection made by a single central decision-maker.26 In the case of global economic
development, global decision-making is needed to select standards for and limitations on
the creation of economic environments. The use of multiple sovereign decision-makers
to make the selection should improve the chances that the best standards and limitations
are selected.
III. STANDARDS FOR AND LIMITATIONS ON SOVEREIGN DECISION-MAKING
By reminding ourselves of the benefits of delegating decision-making authority
within a complex organization, we recognized the benefits of having multiple sovereign
decision-makers for global economic development. If we remind ourselves of the
drawbacks of delegating authority within a complex organization, we can recognize the
hazards inherent in having multiple sovereign decision-makers.
Subordinate decision-makers within a complex organization may abuse their
discretion and depart from the organization’s goals. The departures impose agency costs
on the organization and may exploit individuals or impose externalities on other decisionmakers on the same plane of authority. To curb those departures, the organization must
align the self-interest of its subordinate decision-makers with its goals.
The
organization’s central decision-maker must design standards for and limitations on the
subordinate decision-makers’ exercise of discretion.
So, too, sovereign decision-makers may depart from our goal of global economic
development as they craft their environments for economic development. If we are to
avoid such departures, we must develop standards for and limitations on the exercise of
sovereign discretion. The task of the standards and limitations is to align national selfinterest, or more precisely, the self-interest of national decision-makers and the members
the capabilities of strategic planning and resource allocation and the apparatus necessary for monitoring
and control. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [INSTITUTIONS], at 281.
25

These two powers of constituents permit the Thiebout and Salman mechanisms to induce competition
among governments. See ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS 229-235 (1998).

26

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 80-82.
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of interest groups participating in domestic political and legislative processes, with our
goal. Thus, sovereign decision-making is to foster national economic development that is
consistent with global economic development. Our objective may also define the limits
of private choice among the national economic environments.27
We can restate our enterprise in more general terms. Once we acknowledge the
benefit of delegating decision-making authority in global economic development to
multiple decision-makers, we must restrict the range of preferences that sovereign
decision-makers may entertain in making their decisions if our overall goal of global
economic development is to be served. A restricted range of national preferences is
required if we are to retain at least the benefits of Pareto optimality in global economic
development and transitivity in our global choices.28
A. The Abuse of Sovereign Discretion
The abuse of sovereign discretion has several causes. The self-interest of a
nation’s decision-makers may lead to the abuse of sovereign discretion. The activity
many elected officials find personally satisfying is meeting with and serving constituents.
The self-interest of those officials is furthered by re-election to office and a generous
budget with which to meet constituents’ needs. Economic development serves the selfinterest of a nation’s public decision-makers if it minimizes unemployment during
elections and increases the nation’s tax revenues. A government might envision the
creation of an environment for vibrant economic development as an investment it makes
with the expectation of an increase in its future revenues and the employment of its
people. 29 A vibrant economic environment enhances the value of the government’s net
profits interest in its private enterprises and its net revenue interest in its people’s
consumption. The immediate needs of incumbent public decision-makers, however, can
lead them to subvert the long-term benefits from economic development by seizing
additional revenue or creating unsustainable employment in the present term.
Organized groups that participate in the domestic political and law-making
processes contribute to the abuse of sovereign discretion. In general, economic interest
groups would like to reduce the burden of competition. They strive to reduce that burden
through the segmentation of markets, the erection of barriers to entry, and public
subsidies of their costs. When nations introduce protectionist measures to segment global
27

For a discussion of anti-abuse rules, see part IV.A.1 infra. For a discussion of possible limits on private
choice among national regulatory regimes, see Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive
Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 25-27 (2001). Trachtman would limit private choice among mandatory
provisions of national regulatory law in order to retain such law’s protection of third parties. Id. at 5-6.
28

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 86-101 (discussing the Sen paradox, a corollary to Arrow’s Theorem).

29

William Barker sees the basis for a nation’s income tax to be the value the nation has added “to the
world.” He sees this basis as neither the benefit conferred by a nation upon the taxpayer nor the taxpayer’s
ability to pay. William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcoming the
Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 162, 186-88 (2002).
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markets into national ones or subsidize their enterprises’ participation in global markets,
they depart from the goal of global economic development. The departure imposes
agency costs on the world community, which are borne by voters everywhere. By
increasing the costs to consumers within the enacting nation’s jurisdiction, the departure
exploits those subordinate actors through a redistribution of wealth. By imposing
externalities on other nations’ economic environments, the departure is opportunistic.
Such externalities interfere with the effectiveness of nations’ decision-making about their
economic environments.
A nation’s decision-makers and its organized groups can combine to redistribute
wealth through the design of institutions for its national economic environment. The
choice and design of institution depends on the transaction costs borne by three groups of
actors: sponsoring legislators, interested constituents, and the holders of residual
interests.30 The members of the sponsoring legislative coalition incur decision-making
costs as well as the commitment costs of making the redistribution durable through
subsequent legislative sessions. Interested constituents not only bear the usual agency
costs of pursuing their goals through representatives and the costs of unintended
consequences, but they also must evaluate the cost of participating in the subsequent
interpretation and enforcement of their legislated benefits. The holders of the residual
interests in government intervention include taxpayers, competitors, holders of public
debt, and consumers. The costs to consumers of organizing to champion the benefits
from economic development as a counterweight to redistribution are thought to be
sufficiently high to prevent consumers from having an effective voice in government.31
Thus, the standards and limitations for sovereign discretion must champion the interests
of consumers.
The transaction costs of those three groups shape the preferences of the
individuals composing the legislative coalition. The coalition’s choice of institution
depends in part on the relative homogeneity of the legislators’ preferences.32 Complete
decisions can be made by a legislature when the range of legislator preferences on an
issue is limited. When a legislature does not have sufficiently homogeneous preferences
30

See MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 13-22 (1995). Some of
the transaction costs considered by enacting coalitions and their supporters in their choice of institution to
deliver durable benefits include the ease of subsequent intervention in the affairs of the institution, the
relative lack of transparency afforded by the institution for pursuing redistributive goals, the means of
funding redistributive goals (for example, through a statutory monopoly or through cross-subsidies by
regulation), the political strength of the residual claimants (who under the circumstances can include
competitors, consumers, taxpayers, or government creditors), the commitment costs of special privileges
for the institution, the degree to which management must be decentralized (which raises agency costs), and
the ability of beneficiaries to sustain an ongoing interest in the management of the institution.
31

For this reason, free trade legislation must be championed by industries that benefit from the elimination
of trade barriers, despite the significant benefits to consumers from such legislation. Without those
industrial proxies for consumers, free trade legislation would be blocked by those industries losing
economic rent through the elimination of trade barriers.

32

See HORN, supra note 30, at 15.
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on an issue to enact comprehensive legislation, but the range of preferences is still fairly
well contained, the legislature will enact legislation that delegates further decisionmaking to a hierarchy, such as an administrative agency, a for-profit enterprise, or a nonprofit enterprise. Tax expenditures can subsidize for-profit organizations or use them as
administrators for subsidies to their employees. A hierarchy can make more detailed
decisions than a legislature can because of the centralized authority of the executive and
through a further restriction of the set of preferences held by individuals within the
hierarchy through a combination of incentive systems, personnel selection, and the
creation and maintenance of social norms.33
Where the range of preferences in the legislature is broad enough to prevent
delegation to a hierarchy, but sufficiently limited to permit the legislature to enact vague
legislation, the legislature in effect delegates more detailed decision-making to the courts.
When the range of legislators’ preferences is too broad to permit any legislation, the
decision-making is left to the markets and their existing hierarchies. The existing
hierarchies grapple with collective action problems arising in circumstances of
interdependent work or limited information, and the markets are able to make decisions
under other circumstances.34
A sovereign decision-maker must be concerned with the abuse by subordinate
actors, including private enterprises, of any discretion it confers upon them. We will
have occasion later in this Article to take up anti-abuse rules.
B. Standards to Reduce the Abuse of Sovereign Discretion
As we design the institutional competence of nations for global economic
development, our challenge is to preserve the benefits of having multiple, autonomous
decision-makers while curbing their abuses of discretion. We may curb the abuse of
sovereign discretion through the creation of standards for and limitations on the exercise
of discretion in shaping an environment for global economic development. Standards
structure how a sovereign exercises its discretion within its sphere of autonomy, while
limitations define the boundaries between sovereigns’ spheres of autonomy. Standards
address the exploitation of individuals subject to the sovereign’s authority and the agency
costs that arise from exploitation. In contrast, limitations address opportunism in
international relations and the agency costs that arise from opportunism.
By curbing abuses of sovereign discretion, the standards and limitations help to
define the institutional competence of nations in the realm of global economic
development. Such institutional competence can then serve as the common foundation
for the norms of international trade and taxation. The norms of international taxation
33

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 58-74, 86-101, 179-181 (comparing decision-making by voting and by
hierarchy, and the restriction of preferences within a hierarchy).
34

See MILLER, supra note 6, at 31-34; Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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must preserve the benefits for global economic development of having multiple
autonomous decision-makers, while observing the standards and limitations on the
exercise of sovereign discretion.
Many of the standards and limitations that define the institutional competence of
nations in global economic development already exist and are recognized in other
contexts. Other standards and limitations have yet to be adopted.
I take up standards first. Some of the standards for the exercise of sovereign
discretion govern a nation’s political and legal processes, while other standards affect the
structure of a nation’s markets, the design of national legislation, and competition among
sovereigns.
1. Standards for Political and Legal Processes. Standards that govern political
and legal processes reduce the exploitation of individuals by making it more difficult for
national decision-makers and organized groups to redistribute wealth to themselves
through those processes. Such standards include democratic accountability, a code of
individual rights, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law. Federal systems of
government might be necessary for nations with large populations. Federal systems
prevent central governments from delegating too little decision-making authority to
political subdivisions or giving those subdivisions too little autonomy in their decisionmaking for effective economic development. Federal systems may also give credibility
to a government’s commitment not to seize the property of its people.35
Transparency in and auditing of government expenditures also are useful
standards. The World Bank required the Republic of Chad, as a condition to financing
the construction of an oil pipeline, to direct the payment of all pipeline revenues into an
account controlled by a third person. Funds in the account can only be used for
expenditures that benefit the people of Chad.36 Such an arrangement inhibits the
clandestine transfer of pipeline revenues to an elite. The arrangement also helps pipeline
customers avoid charges of complicity in any future governmental malfeasance.
2. Standards for the Structure of Markets. Standards for competition among
enterprises enhance consumer welfare, even in opposition to groups that seek economic
rents through industrial structure and restraints on trade. Standards for competition
remove impediments that otherwise would segment a market and shelter enterprises from
the pressures of competition. A sovereign’s failure to use its discretion for the benefit of
its consumers exploits those individuals in the sense that enterprises continue to benefit
from the existing segmented structure of the markets. To the extent that the sovereign’s
failure has decreased the rate of its people’s economic development from what is feasible,
the failure has generated agency costs.
35

See Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure
Markets, 149 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 286, 287-90 (1993).

36

See Oil in Chad, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 12, 2002).
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3. Standards of Neutrality for Legislation. Standards are needed to counteract
the legislative exploits of organized groups. The norms of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) impose standards of neutrality on national law-making. These
standards assist in the promotion of competition by creating even larger markets. The
standards of neutrality include nondiscrimination – national treatment and most favored
nation treatment – and transparency.37 These standards remove impediments at the
international level that otherwise would segment national markets by a product’s national
origin or would segment international markets along national or regional lines. Standards
of neutrality impede rent-seeking by sub-national groups, which market segmentation
would facilitate.
Standards that counter the legislative exploits of organized groups also affect the
design of national income tax codes. Organized groups attempt to influence the design of
tax codes to skew the burden of public expenditure away from themselves. The intent of
organized groups can be countered by standards of neutrality similar to those embodied
by the norms of GATT.
A tax code ought to be a neutral factor in business and investment decisions made
within a nation’s own economic environment. An income tax code should not change the
relative prices of goods and services in the private sector.38 To achieve a neutral effect on
relative prices, the distribution of the burden of public expenditure should be neutral
among similarly situated taxpayers. Neutrality in the taxation of similarly situated
taxpayers, sometimes known as horizontal equity, also preserves the benefits of the
delegation by sovereigns of decision-making authority to multiple enterprises within their
economic environments. In those circumstances, equity is a means to institutional
efficiency. Furthermore, a tax code should not discriminate between a domestic
enterprise of a foreign entity and a domestic enterprise of a domestic entity. A tax code
should be neutral as between the two. Moreover, a tax code should not discriminate
against a resident taxpayer’s foreign production. Lastly, the norm of transparency
requires that the tax subsidies in a tax code be identified and included in the national
budgeting process.
Tax norms of neutrality keep a tax system from contributing to the segmentation
of a nation’s markets. If competitors as similarly situated taxpayers labor under different
income tax rates and if the traditional assumption that the incidence of the corporate
income tax falls entirely on shareholders is false, then the tax system has raised a semipermeable boundary between those competitors.39 If some of those competitors are
foreign investors, the tax code has segmented markets along national lines.
37

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], arts. I
(most favored nation treatment for GATT members), III (national treatment of foreign-produced products
in matters of taxation and regulation), XI (transparency in measures restricting trade by converting all such
measures into monetary charges).

38

Barker, supra note 29, at 188-89.

39

For a discussion of the incidence of a corporate income tax, see part III.D.2 infra.
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4. Sovereign Competition as a Standard. There is another standard that has the
potential to reduce the exploitation of individuals by organized groups through political
and legislative processes. Competition among sovereigns in the design of national
economic environments reduces the exploitation of individuals by organized groups.40 A
nation’s need to maintain living standards similar to those enjoyed in neighboring
countries is a useful check on rent-seeking by economic groups. Furthermore, sovereign
competition may lead to tax reform.41 A nation’s need to broaden its tax base and reduce
its tax rate acts as a counterweight to the inevitable pressure for tax subsidies and benefits
residual groups who otherwise would bear the cost of tax subsidies through higher tax
rates.42 Tax competition may also lessen the discrimination against foreign investors,
who otherwise present a tempting source of additional revenue external to a nation’s
electorate.43 In this sense, competition supports the standard of nondiscrimination for the
legislative process. Moreover, sovereign competition helps to generate and evaluate
different national environments for economic development.
The movement of individuals and enterprises among nations promotes sovereign
competition. The free movement of capital among national economic environments,
then, must be a standard for the exercise of sovereign discretion.44 A national tax code
generally should not impede the movement of investment among nations. In particular, a
nation’s tax code should not discriminate against the foreign investment of its residents, if

40

See also Albert Breton et al., Decentralization and Subsidiarity: Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation,
19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 21, 43 (1998) (“competition facilitates the control and regulation of the
exercise of political power”).
41

See also OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 13-14 (1998)
(“Globalization has also been one of the driving forces behind tax reforms, which have focused on base
broadening and rate reductions, thereby minimizing tax induced distortions.”).
42

Note, however, that such tax reform may be accompanied by increased government borrowing to fund
direct subsidies that replace the tax subsidies.
43

See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89
GEORGETOWN L.J. 543, 580-585 (2001) (funding a state’s redistributive goals through discriminatory
taxation of foreign investors).
44

Removing impediments to foreign portfolio investment can be beneficial to a nation’s capital markets.
See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 650
(4th ed. 1997); Barry Eichengreen et al., Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects
12 (International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 172, 1998). The greater supply of portfolio capital
should lower the cost of capital in that nation. Suppliers of portfolio capital are subject to behavioral
peculiarities documented by behavioral economists; those peculiarities lead to crises in capital markets,
which need to be buffered. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in
Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 1998, at 7; but see Economics Focus: Capital
Controversies, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 1998) (partly taking issue with Bhagwati’s article). Removing
impediments to foreign direct investment may also be beneficial. Foreign direct investment does not
contribute supply to a nation’s capital markets, but does provide additional production for the nation’s other
markets.
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sovereign competition is to serve its purpose.45 A sovereign ought not to tie its investors
to its own capital markets.46
International capital markets also encourage sovereign competition. The pricing
of sovereign debt transmits useful information about the relative success of national
economic environments in fostering economic development.
C. Limitations on the Abuse of Sovereign Discretion
The other kind of measure that reduces the abuse of sovereign discretion in the
shaping of an economic environment is the limitation. Limitations reduce opportunism in
international economic relations by making the cross-border transfer of costs and benefits
more difficult for national decision-makers and organized groups. Limitations serve a
function among nations similar to that of property rights.
Within their spheres of autonomy and subject to the standards for exercising
sovereign discretion, nations would experiment in the design of their economic
environments. A comparative evaluation of those economic environments will help us
identify those promoting robust development. To preserve those experiments and the
integrity of our comparative evaluation, we must avoid the imposition of externalities by
one economic environment on another. Limitations are the measures channeling
sovereign discretion that reduce the imposition of externalities between national spheres
of autonomy.
Consider the drawbacks of sovereign competition.47 Competition among
sovereigns can take the form of the imposition of costs by one sovereign on another’s
45

At present, neither international trade law nor international tax law prohibits a residence nation’s
discrimination against foreign production by its residents. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX. L. REV. 131, 158 (2001). An example of such
discrimination is accelerated depreciation available only for equipment used domestically. Id. Other
examples include the limitation of shareholder imputation credits to dividends attributable to domestic
source income. Id. at 154.
46

The Netherlands violated the Treaty of Rome’s provision requiring free movement of capital when the
Dutch income tax system gave imputation credits to shareholders only for dividends received from Dutch
companies and not for dividends received from other EU companies. Staatssecretaris van Financin v.
B.G.M. Verkooijen (European Court of Justice, June 6, 2000). Under the Dutch imputation system, Dutch
portfolio investors had an incentive to participate only in Dutch equity markets.

47

Reuven Avi-Yonah fears that technological change and tax competition among nations may reduce
global tax revenue over time. The use of electronic commerce rather than permanent establishments to
distribute goods and services will shift taxable income from consumption jurisdictions to production
jurisdictions. Furthermore, competition among nations as production jurisdictions will encourage business
entities to transfer their production to production tax havens. The shift of the global tax base in favor of
production tax havens will reduce business income tax receipts in consumption jurisdictions. See Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1573, 1586-97 (2000); see also OECD, supra note 41, at 14 (tax competition reducing nations’ ability
to meet redistributive goals through tax revenue). I have several comments on Avi-Yonah’s assertion.
First, we should not lose sight of our overall goal: economic development that increases the well-being of
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economic environment or the taking of benefits by one sovereign from another’s
economic environment. The imposition of externalities transfers wealth from one
sovereign to another (possibly with a net loss of wealth), impairs the effectiveness of the
burdened sovereign’s economic environment, and distorts the economic decision-making
of both sovereigns.
The cause of opportunistic competition among sovereigns lies with the national
decision-makers and organized groups of the exploiting sovereign. In the case of a cost,
the constituents of the burdened sovereign become an additional residual group to bear
the cost of the exploiting sovereign’s national legislation (a residual group to which the
national decision-makers of the exploiting sovereign are not accountable, even in theory).
In the case of a benefit, the nation’s decision-makers seek additional revenue without
burdening their own constituents and reducing the rate of capital formation within their
own economy. The burden of the revenue taken from another sovereign falls on that
nation’s constituents and economy.
In the case of a complex organization, the central decision-maker must limit
opportunistic competition among the organization’s subordinate decision-makers if the
organization is to benefit fully from the grant of autonomy to those decision-makers. So,
too, in the case of global economic development, we must limit opportunistic competition
among nations if we are to benefit fully from the participation of multiple sovereigns in
the shaping of the global economic environment.
Limitations on a sovereign’s decision-making address opportunism by prohibiting
subsidies and taxation that invade other sovereigns’ spheres of autonomy over the global
economic environment.
1. Limitations on Subsidies. The norms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) address opportunistic sovereign competition executed through subsidies.
GATT prohibits export subsidies, which ameliorate the general burden of a nation’s
economic environment for those engaged in international trade and increase the profit
margin of exporters.48 Export subsidies can also be an attempt to keep a non-competitive
the world’s people. If such shifts improve the well-being of the world’s people, we should welcome them.
Tax revenue is not the highest good. Second, if such shifts are accompanied by greater global economic
development, any shifts may well be accompanied by an increase in the global tax base, especially when
we take into account personal income and aggregate payrolls. Third, tax jurisdictions aren’t necessarily
fungible. Their marginal costs and benefits will differ in offering compelling economic environments to
foreign investment. Without fungibility, tax competition will be limited. See Roin, supra note 43, at 543,
554-562, 568-580. Fourth, transaction costs or “frictions” may stymie tax competition. See Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 8, at 231-239, 260 (identifying the frictions of externalities, costs of mobility,
bundled public goods, asymmetric information, spillovers, and the possible lack of entrepreneurs in public
goods).
48

For the prohibition on export subsidies, see GATT, supra note 37, at art. XVI; Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
Subsidies Code], art. 3.1(a). At present, the ban on export subsidies only reaches trade in goods. Neither
GATT nor the Subsidies Code reaches export subsidies for services or investment.
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feature of a nation’s economic environment in place but to waive it for the benefit of
exporters. Tax expenditures that subsidize exports are subject to the norms of GATT.49
GATT also permits measured retaliation against domestic subsidies of specific impact,
which generally are elements of a national economic environment that benefit specific
industries.50 Both kinds of subsidies skew competition among private enterprises in
international markets.51
The GATT approach generally encourages the modification of the nation’s
economic environment so the non-competitive element is eliminated for all actors and the
beneficial element is either made available to all or to no one.52 In this sense, GATT
requires sovereign competition to affect all of a sovereign’s constituents when it
indirectly affects the constituents of other sovereigns. GATT’s norms dealing with
subsidies thus indirectly act as standards reducing the exploitation of a sovereign’s own
constituents through non-uniform treatment. More generally, we should encourage
competition among sovereigns on the basis of the uniform application of their economic
environments and not on the basis of departures from selected elements of a national
economic environment, if we are to avoid the exploitation of members of residual groups
by organized groups.
2. Limitations on Taxation. Limitations also promote global economic
development by defining a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the global income tax
base. The limitations define the opportunistic taking of revenue by one sovereign from
49

See Subsidies Code, supra note 48, at art. 1, ¶ 1.1(a)(1)(ii); Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1621, 1637-1639 (2001). An exemption system in itself does not constitute an
illegal export subsidy under GATT, although its application to transactions that originate in the residence
state is an export subsidy under GATT. McDaniel, supra, at 1628.
50

See Subsidies Code, supra note 48, at art. 2, ¶ 2.1. In addition to having specific impact, domestic
subsidies must also be contingent upon either export performance or the use of domestic goods over
imported goods. Subsidies Code art. 3, ¶ 3.1.

51

Paul McDaniel identifies three negative effects of export subsidies, including those distributed through
tax subsidies: the skewing of sales away from third-country producers who have a comparative advantage
over the subsidized producers, the missed opportunity by the subsidized producers to achieve new
efficiencies, and possible retaliation by third countries through competing subsidies. See Paul R.
McDaniel, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions, 57 TAX L.
REV. 275, 295 (2004). Export subsidies may also increase the value of the subsidizing nation’s currency,
reducing the benefit of the subsidy without reducing its cost to the nation’s taxpayers. See id. at 296.
52

The GATT approach is reflected in the panel report on U.S. foreign sales corporations: “The United
States is free to maintain a world wide system, a territorial tax system or any other system it sees fit. This
is not the business of the WTO. What it is not free to do is to establish a regime of direct taxation, provide
an exemption from direct taxes specifically related to exports, and then claim it is entitled to provide such
an export subsidy because it is necessary to eliminate a disadvantage to exporters created by the U.S. tax
system itself. In our view, this is no different from imposing a corporate tax of, say, 75 percent, and then
arguing that a special tax rate of 25 percent for exporters is necessary because the generally applicable
corporate tax rates in other Members is only 25 percent.” Panel Report on U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation
Regime, WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999), paragraph 7.122, available at http://www.wto.org.
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another sovereign’s economic environment.53 In general, a national income tax code
ought not to impose externalities on other nations if our economic decision-making is to
be sound.
There are several kinds of externalities we must avoid. We must avoid
externalities that impair the benefits of having multiple sovereigns involved in global
economic development. Furthermore, we must avoid externalities that impair incentives
for other nations to foster economic development, including capital formation.
Moreover, we must avoid externalities that impair the competitiveness of other nations’
markets.
Our overall goal of global economic development gives us three limitations on the
design of national tax codes. First, a nation must have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction
over the income derived from business operations conducted within its territory.54
Second, a nation must have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over portfolio income

53

Daniel Shaviro calls such opportunism “tax exportation.” Through tax exportation, a government places
a burden on outsiders who neither consent to the burden nor share in the benefit funded by the burden.
Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 908
(1992).
54

To the extent that such things can be predicted, there apparently would not be a revenue loss if the United
States moved to an exemption system for the taxation of business income. Tax revenue for the United
States might actually increase. See Harry Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue, 54
NAT’L TAX J. 811, 816-17 (2001) (estimating a revenue increase of nine billion dollars annually, assuming
that foreign-source royalty income continues to be subject to residence-based taxation [under an exemption
system, foreign-source royalty income could no longer be sheltered by excess foreign tax credits]); see also
Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the Middle with
Subpart F, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1525, 1568 (2001). This possible revenue enhancement affects the use of an
exemption system to encourage investment in developing nations. Michael Graetz discusses the use of the
international aspects of a nation’s tax code to redistribute future income to developing nations through the
encouragement of foreign investment. See Michael J. Graetz, Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts,
and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 300-301, 309 (2001). The shift to an exemption system
apparently would eliminate one of the existing incentives for multinational business to invest in production
facilities in low tax jurisdictions: the need to absorb taxes from high-tax jurisdictions through crosscrediting. For additional analysis of the needs of developing nations and the international provisions of
national tax codes, see Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 311 (1999). For the U.S. tax system, David Rosenbloom proposes to ignore the
corporate form of foreign subsidiaries and to exempt from U.S.-residence-based taxation the business
profits of branches and subsidiaries attributable to permanent establishments in nations that appear on a list
of nations with well-developed tax systems. See H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the
Income of Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1525, 1544-48 (2001). All other
income of the foreign subsidiaries would be taxed currently by the United States with a deduction for
foreign income taxes paid. Id. at 1548-50. The gain on appreciated property transferred to a permanent
establishment would also be taxed currently. Id. at 1552-1553. His proposal would eliminate the foreign
tax credit and Subpart F, but would not address the reincorporation of multinational enterprises in tax
havens. Bob Peroni points out the temptation for the federal government to delist countries as a weapon of
foreign relations. Robert J. Peroni, The Proper Approach for Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled
Corporations, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1579, 1590-91 (2001).
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derived anywhere in the world from capital accumulated within its territory.55 Third, a
nation’s tax code must be transparent to the tax authorities of other nations when the code
acts as a conduit for portfolio investment by residents of other nations.
These three limitations are based in part on the value to global economic
development of the use of multiple sovereign decision-makers in the shaping of the
global economic environment. We have seen that the use of multiple autonomous
decision-makers gives us, among other things, a variety of approaches in the design of
national economic environments.56 That variety is essential because it enables us to use
the comparative method to evaluate the relative efficacy of different economic
environments, thus partly overcoming our inherent lack of information about
endowments, our inability to use controlled experiments in the public sphere, and the
inevitable incompleteness of decision-making.57 It is only through the comparison of
different economic environments that we can determine the effect of different
institutional arrangements on economic performance. The use of multiple sovereign
decision-makers also gives us the benefit of sovereign competition.58 Sovereign
competition assists nations to be attentive to the cultivation of their economic
environments.
Low-income nations that suffer from chronically poor economic performance
usually have institutional arrangements that impede effective economic change. An
international decisional environment that promotes global economic development should
encourage government decision-makers in low-income nations to create better
economies. We have already discussed the role in economic development of standards
for government decision-making. The creation of a stronger economy also depends on
government decision-makers shaping an economic environment that presents proper
incentives to public and private entrepreneurs to engage in productive activity.
In terms of public finance, we ask government decision-makers to be attentive to
the design of their economic environments and to avoid confiscatory measures to address
their immediate problems. Government decision-makers must see their economic
environments as assets to be cultivated. Cultivation of such an asset might consist of
building infrastructure, investing in human capital through health and education, or
leaving retained earnings within the economy to become additional capital. Any of these

55

William Barker reaches a similar conclusion, but partly on the basis of equity. See Barker, supra note
29, at 162, 195-97.
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See part II supra. Other benefits of the use of multiple sovereign decision-makers in global economic
development include the release of information and action hidden from a central decision-maker,
competition among decision-makers, and improved decision-making when unified global action is needed.
Id.

57

See the text supra in part II at notes 13-23.

58

See the text supra in part II at notes 24-25.
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measures would increase the value of the economic environment and, from the
government’s point of view, increase its revenue stream from the asset.
Low-income nations usually have primitive infrastructure, including their
facilities for health and education. One route a low-income nation might take is to set a
low rate of tax to compensate for the necessary private investment in substitute
infrastructure. If the selflessness of government decision-makers is in question, one
might prefer the infrastructure to be built by private enterprises and as it is needed rather
than by the government.
To preserve the value of multiple sovereign decision-makers, we must address the
temptation of autonomous decision-makers not to bear the full market consequences of
their decisions but to import benefits from and export burdens to other national economic
environments. The three limitations on the design of national tax codes address this
temptation by defining the boundaries among national spheres of autonomy in taxation.
In doing so, the limitations lay down rules for sovereign competition in taxation.
Two decisions that a sovereign decision-maker must make, and for which we seek
a variety of answers, are the size of a nation’s public sector and the rate of capital
formation within the nation’s economic environment. The two decisions are interrelated.
Thus, in designing its income tax code, a nation must determine the trade-off between
private capital formation, on the one hand, and government consumption and investment,
on the other. In effect, a nation must determine the size of its public sector both now and
in the future. The higher the tax rate on business income, the lower the rate of capital
formation by taxable enterprises can be. One factor a nation must take into account in a
decision to lower the tax rate on business income is the likely future tax revenue that
additional capital would generate.
This leads us to the first limitation. We must grant each nation exclusive
prescriptive jurisdiction over the income from business operations conducted within its
economic environment, if the nation is to control the trade-off between current
consumption and capital formation. If other nations impose a tax burden on its business
operations, the additional burden will reduce the possible rate of capital formation within
its economic environment and the future return on its foregone consumption. The
uncertainty of its future return would encourage a nation to abandon the global goal of
capital formation and take what tax revenue it can for current consumption.
The second limitation is also related to capital formation and the size of a nation’s
public sector. We must assure a nation that it will retain prescriptive jurisdiction over the
future returns on capital formed within its economic environment. Thus, a nation should
have prescriptive jurisdiction over portfolio income arising from capital accumulated
within its economic environment, regardless of where the capital is later invested.
Moreover, such jurisdiction must be exclusive. If it is not, the nation cannot determine,
or rely on, the compounding effect of capital formation within its economic environment.
The uncertainty of its compounded future return encourages a nation to abandon the
global goal of capital formation in favor of current consumption.
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Business income is the residual made possible in part by a nation’s economic
environment. Portfolio income is the return on capital; capital is made possible by a
government’s decision to forego immediate taxation of all of the residual of a business
operation. To preserve incentives to the government in its cultivation of its economic
environment, we should leave the residual within the government’s exclusive prescriptive
jurisdiction and leave the portfolio income there as well. Thus, the different treatment of
business income and portfolio income proposed here is the result of preserving the same
incentive to governments to cultivate their economic environments.
The first limitation would also preserve the competitiveness of other nations’
markets. To the extent that a corporate income tax is borne in part by customers, a
supplementary income tax imposed by one nation on activities conducted within another
nation can reduce competition within that other nation’s markets. The supplementary
income tax would affect the relative prices of otherwise competing goods.
The third limitation requires transparency in the administration of tax codes.
Such transparency combats the use of one nation’s laws by taxpayers of another nation to
evade their own nation’s valid taxes. Transparency in the administration of tax codes
prevents the imposition of externalities by financial tax havens on consumption
jurisdictions. Through their bank secrecy laws, financial tax havens encourage the
evasion of home nation taxation to their profit. Transparency in the administration of tax
codes requires that bank secrecy laws be subordinate to the needs of tax administration.
The secrecy of tax information has several undesirable effects.59 Such secrecy
relieves the pressure from powerful individuals against the enactment of confiscatory tax
regimes; such individuals can protect their income through non-transparent offshore
investment rather than moving to forestall the confiscatory taxation in the first place. The
effective exemption of such favored individuals from the full brunt of a nation’s tax code
opens the door to discriminatory taxation of those without access to offshore investments.
Furthermore, the secrecy of tax information increases the opportunities of corrupt
administrators and advisors to extract rents from the investors they serve. The secrecy of
tax and banking information is sometimes justified on the grounds that it prevents the
misuse of information by home governments, for example, to discriminate against
disfavored groups.
This concern might be better addressed through internal
nondiscrimination law backed up by international human rights norms. To ban the
exchange of tax information is an overly broad shield against discrimination.
These limitations serve the standard of democratic accountability for the exercise
of sovereign discretion. They ensure that a nation only taxes the income of constituents,
in the case of portfolio income, or the income of business operations that employ
constituents, in the case of business income. Foreign investors have no formal role in a
nation’s legislative process.
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See Roin, supra note 43, at 597-99.
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(a) Exemption Systems for Business Income. These limitations on taxation
suggest that nations should adopt exemption systems for the taxation of international
business income.60 Under an exemption system, a nation does not tax the income
generated by the foreign operations of its resident entities, whether those operations are
conducted as branches or subsidiaries.61 A nation does tax the business income generated
by a domestic business operation, regardless of whether the operation is conducted by a
resident or a nonresident entity.62 The tax concept of a permanent establishment can be
used to define an entity’s business operations, both foreign and domestic.63
The limitations on taxation suggest that a nation should not have prescriptive
jurisdiction over the income generated by its resident entities’ foreign business
operations. Such business income should remain within the exclusive prescriptive
jurisdiction of the foreign nation. If such business income is distributed to the resident
entity, the dividends should be exempt from taxation by the nation of residence; the
underlying business income was within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the foreign nation.
Dividends are distributions of the residual.64 Gain realized by the parent entity from the
sale of stock in a foreign corporation should also be exempt from taxation by the entity’s
jurisdiction of residence. Such gain reflects the accumulation of earnings exempt from
taxation. Gain realized by a foreign branch on the sale of assets producing exempt
income should also be exempt from taxation by the parent entity’s jurisdiction. Expenses
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Julie Roin would permit nations to impose a small tax on the income their resident entities derive from
their foreign operations in recognition of the services provided by a home nation in the form of diplomatic
protection and representation in international trade negotiations. See Roin, supra note 43, at 586-590.
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There are several variants of an exemption system in existence today. For a concise account, see HUGH
J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 372-77 (2d ed. 2004). Terrence Chorvat
points out that a deferral system functions much like an exemption system. See Terrence R. Chorvat,
Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIZONA L. REV. 835, 843-44 (2000) (citing David
Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 J. OF PUB. ECON. 187 (1985) and Hans Werner
Sinn, Taxation and the Birth of Foreign Subsidiaries, in TRADE WELFARE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (Horst
Herberg and Ngo Van Long eds., 1993)).
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A tax on business income could be converted into a consumption tax. See Barker, supra note 29, at 21214. Michael Graetz believes that consumption taxes can be imposed “in a manner quite similar to income
taxes,” which may make GATT’s distinction between direct taxes and indirect taxes to be meaningless.
See Graetz, supra note 54 at 261, 298-99.
63

Business operations conducted on the high seas or in space may be difficult to allocate to a specific
nation’s economic environment. A multinational tax treaty could assist us here, perhaps by allocating the
income from such operations among the markets served. Until the advent of a multinational tax treaty,
such income might be treated under individual nations’ anti-abuse regimes. Anti-abuse regimes are
discussed in part IV.A.1 infra.

64

If, under an anti-abuse regime, shareholders with a small holding are not taxed currently by their
jurisdiction of residence on their share of a controlled foreign corporation’s diverted portfolio income, the
portion of their dividends attributable to such income must be taxable by their jurisdiction of residence.
Anti-abuse regimes are discussed in part IV.A.1 infra.
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allocable to foreign business operations would not be deductible in the jurisdiction of
residence.65
Instead of distributing its residual, the foreign business operation might
accumulate and employ the residual in its future operations. The nation of the parent
entity’s residence should not have taxing jurisdiction over the income generated by such
capital accumulated by a foreign operation of one of its resident entities; such income lies
within the exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction of the foreign nation. Such income includes
royalties from the licensing of intellectual property developed by the foreign business
operation, regardless of the source of those royalties.
The limitations counsel against nations taxing the income generated by the
worldwide operations of their resident entities. Existing worldwide systems of taxation
should be replaced by exemption systems.66 In particular, our goal of global economic
development suggests that the United States should substitute an exemption system for its
current worldwide system of business income taxation.
In addition to promoting our goal of global economic development, an exemption
system avoids the pitfalls of worldwide systems of taxation. Worldwide systems of
taxation inhibit sovereign competition in economic development. To make sovereign
competition effective in economic development, the standards encourage private choice
among national economic environments. To promote such choice, business income must
be taxed at the location of the business operation. This permits private decision-makers
to choose among nations’ economic environments and to make the choice on the basis of
their individual business segments.67
In addition, worldwide systems of taxation depend on the concept of an entity’s
residence, which make the systems difficult to administer. Entities can manipulate the
criteria for determining their residence. Such manipulation permits entities to choose
65

Interest expense would have to be allocated on a worldwide basis. See Michael J. Graetz and Paul W.
Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 NATIONAL TAX
JOURNAL 771, 781 (2001).
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John Steines points out that an exemption system has repercussions for a nation with a classical system
of two levels of tax on corporate income. If we were to exempt an individual’s foreign business income
from domestic taxation, we would also have to exempt distributions to a shareholder from a domestic
corporation made out of its exempt foreign business income. See John P. Steines, Jr., Whether, When, and
How to Tax the Profits of Controlled Foreign Corporations, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1595, 1601-02 n. 8
(2001). The solution may be to tax the net amount of an individual’s foreign business income as portfolio
income. This would, in effect, impute a corporation between the foreign business income and the
individual, exempt the corporation’s foreign business income, and then treat the individual’s income as a
distribution from that corporation.
67

The taxation of an entity’s business income solely on the basis of residence leads to the odd result that a
developing nation providing infrastructure to production facilities might not collect any tax at all. To
develop tax revenues from business operations under a residence-based system, a developing nation would
have to become a headquarters tax haven.
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among nations for their place of residence on the basis of tax rates alone rather than on
the basis of economic environments. This results in entities relocating their formal place
of residence to headquarters tax havens.68 Furthermore, establishing an entity’s residence
on the basis of the residence of its owners is impractical for publicly held entities.69
(b) Worldwide Systems for Portfolio Income. The limitations on taxation suggest
that nations should have worldwide systems of taxation for the portfolio income of their
resident investors. Nations ought not to impose a tax on the portfolio income of foreign
investors.70 A national tax code should not offer a foreign tax credit for portfolio
income.71 If a business entity transfers capital to a foreign branch, the nation in which the
capital was formed may impute a return on such capital. An investor’s nation of
residence should have prescriptive jurisdiction over gain realized on the investor’s
disposition of an investment.
Worldwide systems for the taxation of portfolio income do not inhibit sovereign
competition to the degree that worldwide systems for the taxation of business income
do.72 The location of international portfolio investment is primarily dependent on risk
68

See Avi-Yonah, supra note 47 [Globalization], at 1573, 1593-97.
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Robert Green has suggested the alternative of imputing a publicly held entity’s income to its
shareholders, which might avoid the need to determine the nationality of the entity. See Robert A. Green,
The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18,
70-74 (1993). Such imputation may be particularly difficult to administer. See id. at 72; Reuven S. AviYonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1301,
1313 (1996).
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Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg would eliminate withholding taxes on foreign portfolio income and
push for multilateral arrangements for improving taxpayer compliance with residence-based tax on
portfolio income. Michael J. Graetz and Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L.
REV. 537, 578-585 (2003).
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Under the baseline established by the limitations on taxation, a foreign tax credit would constitute a
capital export subsidy. Furthermore, a foreign tax credit permits the nation of importation to determine the
amount of the subsidy (subject to market conditions and the terms of tax treaties), which would make the
economic decision-making of the capital exporting nation indeterminate. Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg
would substitute a deduction for foreign taxes for the foreign tax credit when it comes to foreign portfolio
investment. Graetz and Grinberg, supra note 70, at 568-575. Gary Hufbauer and Joanna van Rooij would
condition any deduction for foreign income taxes paid on the source country instituting a reporting system
for dividends to the residence country. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JOANNA M. VAN ROOIJ, U.S. TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 66-68 (1992). If the United States adopted an
exemption system for the taxation of business income but retained a credit system for portfolio income, its
foreign tax credit could be simplified. Because foreign nations typically tax foreign investors’ business
income more heavily than their portfolio income, only lightly taxed income of U.S. investors would remain
for crediting. Hence, the United States would be able to reduce the number of baskets necessary for the
proper operation of a foreign tax credit limitation. See Steines, supra note 66, at 1605.
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Residence-based taxation of the portfolio income of individuals may also be justified on the basis of
equity, or redistributive possibilities. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 69 [Simplification], at 1316, 1336. The
redistribution of wealth can be based on economic considerations, as well as equity: redistribution may
affect the rate of economic development.
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and return, rather than on a nation’s economic environment. Sovereign competition in
shaping economic environments is unlikely to affect the location of portfolio investment.
Furthermore, international capital markets make it difficult for a nation to tax the
portfolio income of foreign investors. Depending on the global demand for debt capital,
it may be difficult for a nation, as a matter of market conditions, to tax the interest
income of foreign investors at all or to maintain the source-based taxation of portfolio
income generally. This inability to tax the interest income of foreign investors has
justified to some observers the residence-based taxation of worldwide interest income, if
not of all portfolio income, so that all such income is in fact taxed.73
Recall that the standards for the exercise of sovereign discretion require national
income tax codes to conform to norms of tax neutrality.74 We would achieve true capital
export neutrality, or neutrality in the worldwide allocation of the supply of capital, if each
nation had exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the portfolio income of its resident
investors.75 Each investor would be subject to uniform worldwide taxation of its
portfolio income, because such income would be taxable by only one nation and by that
nation no matter where the investor puts the capital to use.76 True capital export
neutrality allocates capital to the uses with the highest pre-tax risk-adjusted returns, all
other things (including economic environments) being equal.
Worldwide systems for the taxation of portfolio income still retain the problems
of the manipulation by taxpayers of the criteria for residence and the failure by taxpayers
73

See Avi-Yonah, supra note 47 [Globalization], at 1579-86, 1667-70. Forms of capital other than debt
capital – equity, real property, tangible personal property, and intangible property – have different degrees
of mobility than debt capital. (Intangibles are highly mobile in the sense that they can be withdrawn easily
from a jurisdiction at the end of the licensing term. Their consumption is non-rivalrous, however, so higher
returns elsewhere do not necessarily mean the intangibles would be withdrawn from a jurisdiction yielding
a lower return.) It is more feasible for source jurisdictions to tax the returns from those forms of capital
than the returns on debt capital.
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See section III.B.3 supra.
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See Barker, supra note 29, at 195. Capital export neutrality is discussed in part III.D.1 infra.

76

The case of individual investors is more complicated, but its analysis reaches the same conclusion.
Affluent individuals must decide how much of their after-tax income to save and how much to consume.
This decision, and by extension, the supply of savings, is affected by the rate of return on savings. The
policy of capital import neutrality would address this prior decision by affluent individual investors and is
said to maximize world savings. Once affluent individuals have determined the amount of their savings,
they then must decide upon the allocation of those savings among possible investments. The policy of
capital export neutrality addresses this second decision. When these two policies conflict, Thomas Horst
argues that the policy of capital export neutrality should be our choice because the demand for capital is
more elastic than the supply of capital with regard to the rate of return. See Barker, supra note 29, at 191
(citing Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94 Q.J. ECON.
793, 793-96 (1980)). Barker believes that the policy of capital import neutrality does not in fact have an
effect on the individual investor’s decision to save or consume after-tax income, which would eliminate the
policy as an alternative. See id. at 191-92.
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to report their foreign portfolio income. These remaining problems are taken up later in
this Article when it turns to problems in collective action.
3. Distinguishing Between Business Income and Portfolio Income. The
distinction between business income and portfolio income is mainly one of the decisionmaking authority of the taxpayer. The taxpayer derives business income when it has
direct control over the activities that create the cash flow that can be distributed to those
making investments in the enterprise.77 Portfolio income is the distributed cash flow
received by those investors. Business income is not a return on a factor of production; it
is the residual or created value of the business operation.78
Portfolio investors have only indirect control over the activities that create the
cash flow out of which they are to be paid. Although an investor may restrict an
enterprise’s discretion through contractual covenants, nevertheless the investor must be
satisfied with acting indirectly through the enterprise’s decision-makers, bearing a layer
of agency costs not borne by the enterprise.79
The difference in the decision-making authority of the taxpayer leads to a
difference in the manner in which investments are selected. The location of international
direct investment exploits the investor’s proprietary know-how or its economies of scale
or scope. The location of international portfolio investment, on the other hand, is
primarily dependent on risk and return.80
77

Roger Gordon and Joosung Jun draw a similar distinction between portfolio financing and parent equity
financing for a foreign operation. Parent equity financing (which, in my terminology, generates business
income) allows joint control and operation in the home and host nations, but portfolio financing affects
only the ownership of the foreign operation’s income. Roger Gordon & Joosung Jun, Taxes and the Form
of Ownership of Foreign Corporate Equity, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (A. Giovannini et al.,
eds., 1993).
78

See Barker, supra note 29, at 195. Michael Devereux and Glenn Hubbard refer to this residual as
economic rent, that is, a return in excess of a firm’s cost of capital. The firm’s intangibles, companyspecific cost advantages, and economies of scale associated with its headquarter activities can be the source
of such returns. See Michael P. Devereux & R. Glenn Hubbard, Taxing Multinationals, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 7920 (September 2000); R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and
International Competitiveness, TAXES 213, 218 (March 2004) (economic rent as distinguishing foreign
direct investment from portfolio investment).
79

Companies derive either business income or portfolio income from their working capital, depending
whether such capital is employed in the business or is temporarily idle. For ease of administration and
compliance, we might want to categorize the income from working capital as business income for tax
purposes, subject to a limitation on the amount of the entity’s working capital. Michael Graetz and Paul
Oosterhuis would use a de minimis rule based on gross income or total assets. See Graetz & Oosterhuis,
supra note 65, at 775.
80

Foreign direct investment is said to complement domestic investment, as enterprises expand to exploit
economies of scale or scope or to exploit their proprietary know-how. See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note
70, at 549 (and the authorities cited in their footnotes 50 and 51). In contrast, foreign portfolio investment
is said to substitute for domestic investment, with its location primarily dependent on risk and return. Id.
(and the authorities cited in their footnotes 53 and 54).
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To foster global economic development, nations must focus on the decisionmaking authority of those with direct control of the activities that create the cash flow out
of which investment returns, employee compensation, and taxes are paid. We would
expect nations to shape their economic environments to influence those decision-makers.
The taxation of business income is an important component of a nation’s economic
environment.
4. The Special Case of Intangibles. Intellectual property, or intangibles, presents
a special case for three reasons. First, the consumption of intangibles is non-rivalrous;
the use of an intangible in a foreign jurisdiction doesn’t necessarily prevent its use in the
home jurisdiction. For that reason, the policy of locational or capital export neutrality
isn’t a consideration in the taxation of royalties from intangibles. The owner of
intangibles isn’t faced with the question of choosing among national economic
environments for the allocation of its capital.
Second, a multinational enterprise frequently exploits its intangibles entirely inhouse, without licensing the intangibles to outsiders. Transaction cost economics
suggests that the companies that engage in foreign direct investment are technically
innovative and cannot safeguard their intangibles through long-term contracts.81 To
exploit their intangibles, such companies must own the foreign operations that make use
of their intangibles. Those companies derive imputed royalty income, rather than armslength royalty income.
Intangibles present a special case in a third sense. National governments
frequently permit taxpayers to expense the costs of developing intangibles when those
costs ordinarily would be capitalized. Governments subsidize the development of
intangibles through this tax expenditure and arguably are entitled to receive the deferred
tax revenue from the intangible’s income stream as a result. Note that the expense
incurred by the taxpayer in developing an intangible reflects the intangible’s potential
global return. The government that subsidized the development of the intangible for
global use thus is arguably entitled to include the intangible’s global royalties in its tax
base. Conversely, a government should not tax the royalties from intangibles developed
abroad. Such taxation arguably would be discriminatory, because the government did not
subsidize the development of those intangibles.82 We could view government
subsidization of the development of intangibles partly as a public investment in a nation’s
economic environment and partly as an investment in the government’s future stream of
tax revenue.
This Article’s treatment of portfolio income is consistent with this view of
intangibles. Under that treatment, the worldwide returns on intangibles are properly
taxable by the nation in which the intangibles were developed (and possibly subsidized).
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See WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [Institutions], at 290-94, 296.

82

See Barker, supra note 29, at 208-209.
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Royalties would be deductible in the nation where the intellectual property is used and
would not be subject to a withholding tax.
5. The Returns on Foreign Direct Investment. The limitations on prescriptive
jurisdiction over the global income tax base have repercussions for the taxation of the
returns on foreign direct investment. Recall that the limitations leave business income
with the nation in which the underlying business operation is located. Such business
income is the residual after the returns on capital have been paid and reflects in part the
contribution made by a nation’s economic environment. Because of the value to global
economic development of sovereign competition and the other benefits of using multiple
sovereigns, this residual should be exempt from further taxation when it is distributed to a
parent corporation. Hence, the parent corporation would be entitled to a deduction for
intercorporate dividends.83
Interest, rent, and royalties paid to a parent corporation would be deductible in the
nation of source and taxable in the nation in which the underlying capital was
accumulated, the same treatment these returns would receive when they are paid to
unrelated persons. The nation of source ought not to impose a withholding tax on
payments of dividends, interest, rent, or royalties. The limitations permit the nation of
source to tax the underlying income out of which dividends are paid, while reserving the
other items to the nation in which the underlying capital was accumulated. National tax
codes would be entitled to impute a return on assets, intangibles, and borrowed funds
made available by a resident entity to a foreign branch.
The limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction over the global income tax base do not
relieve the pressure on national tax administrators to distinguish between true dividends
and disguised interest, rent, or royalties or to distinguish between true interest, rent, or
royalties and disguised dividends. National tax codes would need to police incomeshifting and income-extracting techniques through anti-abuse rules. National tax codes
would also have to police the use of corporations by individuals as passive investment
vehicles.
6. Preferential Tax Regimes and Illicit Tax Competition. Preferential tax
regimes are an illicit form of sovereign competition. Preferential tax regimes offer tax
rates to new business operations owned by non-residents that are lower than the tax rates
in force for business operations owned by residents. Pressure from internal interest
groups frequently requires a preferential tax regime to be ring-fenced: the beneficiary
cannot deal in the sovereign’s internal market but must export its products or services.
Ring-fenced preferential regimes subsidize exports and thus violate this Article’s
limitation prohibiting export subsidies.84 Preferential tax regimes that are not ring-fenced
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Dividends paid to holders of small shareholdings would be subject to taxation if their nation of residence
employs a classical system of coordination between corporate and shareholder income taxes.
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Preferential tax regimes that subsidize exports of goods violate GATT. See Joel Slemrod & Reuven AviYonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV.533, 550 (2002)
(referring to production tax havens); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes,
26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1683, 1686-87 (2001). The OECD report suggests that ring-fenced tax incentive
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may affect the relative prices of goods and services within a sovereign’s economic
environment and thus violate this Article’s standard requiring neutrality in tax
legislation.85 Accordingly, preferential tax regimes exceed the institutional competence
of a nation.86 To attract branches and subsidiaries of non-residents without abusing its
sovereign discretion, a nation must lower its tax rate for all business operations,
regardless of ownership.87 We might refer to this conclusion as the tax norm of national

regimes are detrimental to global economic growth; such regimes are said to fall outside the “standard taxrevenue paradigm.” See Engel, supra note 54, at 1577, n. 279. Another export subsidy may lie within a
nation’s source rules if the nation uses a foreign tax credit system. For example, the United States uses a
set fifty-fifty division between manufacturing and sales income for products manufactured domestically
and then exported from the United States; the United States then characterizes the sales income as foreign
source. See Treas. Regs. § 1.863-3(b). The sales income is not taxed by the country of importation if the
taxpayer has no permanent establishment in that country, but is eligible for cross-crediting of foreign
income taxes for purposes of the U.S. foreign tax credit. The result for U.S.-based multinational enterprises
with operations in high-tax jurisdictions is that fifty percent of U.S. export income is not taxed by anyone.
See CHARLES I. KINGSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 49-60 (1998); Claire Kelly et al., Panel Transcript
IV, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1711, 1716 (2001) (remarks by Charles I. Kingson). To the extent that export
income is not taxed by anyone, it benefits from an export subsidy in violation of GATT. Reuven AviYonah sees possible export subsidies in the tax regimes of traditional tax havens and headquarters tax
havens. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 84 [Treating], at 1687-88. I disagree, although such tax havens may
run afoul of other standards and limitations presented by this Article. Traditional tax havens have no
income tax for either residents or foreign investors. Even if such tax havens prohibit foreign investors from
providing financial services to residents, such ring-fencing is not an export subsidy. Instead, such ringfencing is a form of market segmentation, which raises prices to residents in their purchases of services. It
may also violate the national treatment standard for services under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services. Headquarters tax havens do have an income tax, but do not tax the income derived by a resident
company from its foreign subsidiaries. As long as those exemption systems are properly structured (that is,
so as not to exclude export income from domestic operations but only to exclude income attributable to
foreign permanent establishments), the systems should pass muster under GATT and under the standards
and limitations developed in this Article. Avi-Yonah would find an export subsidy when an exemption
system excluded foreign source income that was not taxed by the source country. Id. at 1688.
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The standards for legislation are discussed in part III.B.3 supra. The effects of a preferential tax regime
on the sponsoring nation include a possible increase in imports of goods and services (which balances the
inflow of capital and is caused by capital inflows increasing the value of the local currency) and a possible
decrease in exports of goods and services produced by existing, locally owned businesses. Requiring the
foreign-owned business to be conducted in a foreign currency may shield the sponsoring nation from some
of the externalities. See Barker, supra note 29, at 178. Labor costs for locally owned businesses might
increase, depending on initial unemployment and the role of exports in the local economy.
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Reuven Avi-Yonah sees preferential tax regimes as a form of tax competition that does not reflect voter
choice about the size of a nation’s government. Preferential tax regimes are frequently created by
administrative action without voter approval. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 47 [Globalization], at 1627-28.
Preferential tax regimes may also be unjustified on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. See id. at 1628. He
would therefore distinguish preferential tax regimes from regimes with universally low rates. Id. at 162728. Preferential tax regimes may be the result of a collective action problem; because of competition, no
nation feels that it can dispense with them when bidding for new foreign investment. See id. at 1645-46.
87

Julie Roin would permit a small differential between the tax rates for domestic taxpayers and for foreign
taxpayers to reflect the costs incurred by the government in extending representation in international trade
matters and diplomatic protection to domestic taxpayers under international law. See Roin, supra note 43,
at 590-92. To avoid creating an incentive for domestic companies to expatriate, Roin would maintain
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treatment for foreign-owned business activity: business activity owned by foreign
investors should be treated no better and no worse than business activity owned by
domestic investors.
D. Evaluation of Two Traditional Policies
Analysts traditionally have used the policies of capital export neutrality and
capital import neutrality to evaluate rules of international taxation. Neither policy fully
takes into account the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development. If we subordinate these two traditional policies to our goal of global
economic development and take institutional competence into account, we can eliminate
capital import neutrality from consideration and confine the application of capital export
neutrality to capital income only.
1. Capital Export Neutrality. The policy of capital export neutrality asks a
sovereign to consider the combination of the nation’s tax code with those of other nations
and to design the domestic code in such a way as to remove aggregate taxation as a
consideration in a resident enterprise’s choice of location for a business operation. The
policy is usually implemented by the adoption of a tax code that taxes a nation’s residents
on the income from their worldwide operations, with a credit for foreign income taxes
they have paid on their foreign income up to the amount of domestic tax owed on that
foreign income. In effect, a nation tops off the foreign income tax on its residents’
income from foreign operations to bring the aggregate tax burden up to the level borne by
the income from domestic operations.88
The policy of capital export neutrality is inconsistent with this Article’s first
limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the global tax base. The first
limitation provides that a nation may not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the
income arising from business operations conducted within the territory of another nation;
a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the income arising from business operations
conducted within its own territory is to be exclusive. Under the first limitation, a nation
may not impose a topping off tax on the income arising from its residents’ business
operations conducted in other nations.
Capital export neutrality is, however, consistent in result with this Article’s
second limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction. The second limitation provides
that a nation has exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the worldwide portfolio income
of its residents; a nation may not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over any of the
portfolio income of another nation’s residents. The second limitation provides the
identical tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations, and transfer the differential to the taxation of
domestic shareholders. See id. at 591-92.
88

In practice, the policy of capital export neutrality is not implemented fully. For example, a resident
enterprise may elect to eliminate the domestic tax by incorporating its foreign operations as foreign
subsidiaries and repatriating only those earnings for which it has sufficient foreign tax credits to eliminate
the domestic tax.
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locational neutrality that serves as the motivation for the policy of capital export
neutrality, but for portfolio investment only.
The policy of capital export neutrality is usually justified on the grounds of
allocative efficiency.89 Giving nations exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the income
arising from business operations conducted within their own territory is said to be
inefficient, in the sense of skewing decisions about the location for business operations.
Enterprises should not choose the location for new business operations on the basis of
low tax rates, so the policy argues, but instead on the basis of non-tax factors.90 The
policy would neutralize not only the attraction of a foreign nation’s lower tax rate, but
would neutralize the difference between two foreign nations’ lower tax rates.
The justification for the policy is incomplete. It fails to take into account the
difference between allocative efficiency and adaptive efficiency. Allocative efficiency
addresses the maximum output possible for an economy, given a particular institutional
arrangement (including the initial distribution of endowments).91 Allocative efficiency
ties together a particular institutional arrangement and a particular maximum output, as it
were. The maximum output possible with one institutional arrangement of an economy
may well differ from the maximum output that is possible with another institutional
arrangement for that economy. This raises the question of determining and selecting the
institutional arrangement that produces the greatest maximum output for an economy.
Adaptive efficiency addresses the changes in an economy’s institutional arrangement that
permit the economy to achieve a higher maximum output. Adaptive efficiency helps a
society over time to grow economic output larger than the maximum produced by
allocative efficiency at any given time.92
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For a survey of limitations of the economic analysis supporting the policy of capital export neutrality,
see Graetz, supra note 54, at 284-93. Reuven Avi-Yonah has a helpful account of commentary by
economists on capital export neutrality, Avi-Yonah, supra note 47 [Globalization], at 1604-1611, as well as
welfare economics and public choice, id., pages 1611-1616.
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Even within a single national economic environment, locational neutrality might not be the optimal
policy. As Daniel Shaviro has said, “The argument for locationally neutral taxation … is … that absent
differences on the service side taxes should be neutral and minimize behavioral responses.” Daniel
Shaviro, supra note 53, at 909. Locational neutrality fails to take into account the “differences on the
services side.” See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(advancing the thesis that free movement of persons between cities with different levels of taxes and
services will maximize the satisfaction of preferences). In addition to differences in services, there may be
differences in institutional environment.
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See NORTH, supra note 2, at 28 (“with positive transaction costs, resource allocations are altered by
property rights structures”); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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See NORTH, supra note 2, at 80-82; Pavel Pelikan, The Formation of Incentive Systems in Different
Economic Systems, INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 27, 31-33 (Stephan Hedlund, ed., 1987)
(comparing organizational processes to allocative processes). Oliver Williamson refers to allocative
efficiency as a form of second-order economizing. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2 [Mechanisms], at 94
(“Marginal analysis is typically concerned with second-order refinements to the neglect of first-order
economizing.”). Second-order economizing is subordinate to first-order economizing, which deals with the
efficiency of organizations and institutional environments. See id. at 100 (“Economics was too
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We cannot determine the best institutional arrangement a priori, in part because
of the cognitive limitations of decision-makers (including the withholding of information
by others). Instead, we must allow societies to develop different institutional
arrangements and evaluate them by comparison.93 The policy of capital export neutrality
fails to take into account this necessity of having multiple and autonomous decisionmakers, the different economic environments offered by nations, and the role of
competition in limiting abuses of sovereign discretion.
When applied to foreign business operations, the policy of capital export
neutrality imposes a negative externality on nations by distorting the effect of their
decisions about tax rates and capital formation and imposing an additional tax burden on
their economies. If one nation imposes a topping off tax on the income generated by a
resident’s business operation located in a second nation, the effective tax rate in the
second nation on business income will be higher, the possible rate of capital formation
lower, and the level of future tax revenue lower than the second nation had determined.
The second nation is left with the unsatisfactory alternative of raising its tax rate and, via
the mechanism of the first nation’s foreign tax credit, regaining the tax revenue burdening
its economy.
The justification for the policy of capital export neutrality is incomplete in a
second sense. The policy views foreign direct investment as a transfer of net savings
between nations and thus a substitute for domestic business investment. The policy fails
to consider foreign direct investment that extends a resident enterprise’s application of
proprietary intangibles to take advantage of economies of scale and scope and thus serves
as a complement to domestic business investment.94 More specifically, the justification
preoccupied with issues of allocative efficiency, in which marginal analysis was featured, to the neglect of
organizational efficiency, in which discrete structural alternatives were brought under scrutiny.”), 309-311.
The relationship between international law and domestic law runs into an analogous problem. Efficient
domestic rules may come at the expense of efficient rules about prescriptive jurisdiction. See Trachtman,
supra note 27, at 30. In a similar vein, Joel Trachtman asserts that “conflicts efficiency may override
substantive efficiency, just as conflicts justice may override substantive justice…. The question of what
law to apply becomes a fundamental question of justice among overlapping communities and overlapping
substantive goals.” Id. at 42 (citing Gerhard Kegel, Fundamental Approaches, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 3, pp. 4-5 (K. Lipstein, ed. 1987)). Nancy Kaufman points out
the need to separate the concerns of international law from those of domestic law in the analysis of fairness
in taxation. Fairness within a national tax code deals with the distribution among a population of the
burden of a nation’s revenue needs. Fairness as a criterion of international taxation is a characteristic of the
allocation among nations of the competence to tax. Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of
International Income, 29 LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 145, 155-156, 202 (1998). In
contrast, Cliff Fleming, Bob Peroni, and Steve Shay would apply the same concept of fairness –
interpersonal equity – at both the national and international levels. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., et al., Fairness
in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299
(2001).
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See part II supra.
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See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487, 488491 (2003). Institutional economics explains why a resident enterprise cannot simply exploit its proprietary
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fails to take into account the economic benefits of transferring the ownership of existing
business assets to new owners who can use the assets more productively.95
In contrast, foreign portfolio investment is a transfer of net savings and thus a
better candidate than foreign direct investment for the application of the policy of capital
export neutrality. Decisions about the location of foreign portfolio investment are driven
by risk-adjusted return and not by the differences among national economic
environments. This Article does not, however, adopt the underpinnings of the policy.
Instead, this Article’s second limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction is based on
the need for capital formation and the concomitant need to assure national decisionmakers that capital formed through lower tax rates will generate income within the
nation’s future tax base. The second limitation addresses the incentives facing national
decision-makers.
At times, the policy of capital export neutrality serves as a rationalization of selfinterest. The policy inhibits competition among sovereigns in the creation of national
economic environments, a key measure to contain the agency costs of the delegation of
decision-making authority to sovereigns by the world’s people. The policy serves the
self-interest of a nation’s public decision-makers by limiting competition in taxation and
any short-term reduction in a nation’s tax revenues. In addition, domestic interest groups
may view the policy as a way to segment global markets along national lines. In that
sense, the policy of capital export neutrality serves protectionist ends. The policy is a
blunt instrument for addressing the costs of transition to higher standards of living by
means of the international movement of business operations. The policy addresses those
transition costs by attempting to prevent the movement in the first place, rather than by
evaluating the distribution of the benefits from freer trade.96
2. Capital Import Neutrality. The other traditional policy for the evaluation of
international tax rules is capital import neutrality, or private competitiveness. Capital
import neutrality asks a sovereign to recognize a right of each of its resident enterprises
to compete in foreign markets under the same aggregate tax burden as its foreign
competitors. A nation usually implements the policy through the adoption of an
exemption system for the taxation of income derived from its residents’ foreign
operations. Income derived from a resident’s foreign operation is exempt from taxation,
regardless of whether the operation is conducted as a branch or through a foreign
intangibles through contracts with independent local enterprises in the foreign market. Contracts cannot
give the resident enterprise the necessary control over its intangibles; common ownership of the foreign
enterprise and the resident enterprise is required for such control. Multinational enterprises exist in part to
exploit proprietary intangibles that cannot be protected under contracts with independent third parties. See
WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [Institutions], at 290-94.
95

See Desai & Hines, supra note 94, at 494-96. Mihir Desai and James Hines elaborate on this insight by
proposing the international tax policy of capital ownership neutrality. See id.
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Targeted assistance programs may be less expensive in the long run than restrictions on trade. For a
discussion, see Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 199, 211-213 (1989).
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subsidiary. The resident’s income from its foreign operation bears only the tax imposed
by the foreign nation. In contrast, income derived by a resident from a domestic business
operation, whether the income is of foreign source or domestic source, is taxed by the
resident’s nation.
The policy of capital import neutrality coincides in result with this Article’s first
limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the global tax base. The first
limitation provides that a nation may not tax the income arising from business operations
conducted within the territory of another nation; each nation is to have exclusive
prescriptive jurisdiction over income derived from operations conducted within its
territory. The basis for the first limitation, however, is not a concern for the foreign
competitiveness of national champions, but rather a concern for global economic
development.
The policy of capital import neutrality is not consistent with this Article’s second
limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the global income tax base. The
second limitation provides that a nation is to have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over
the worldwide portfolio income of its residents. Because different nations may well
impose different rates of tax on the portfolio income of their residents, income derived by
foreign investors from portfolio investment in a single nation may be subject to different
rates of tax. Thus, a portfolio investor would not invest in a foreign nation under the
same tax burden as competing investors.
There are two traditional justifications for the policy of capital import neutrality.
Neither takes into account the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development. The first seeks efficiency in the allocation of a foreign market’s demand
for capital. This justification has been discredited. The justification wrongly assumed
that the elasticity of the supply of capital was greater than the elasticity of the demand for
capital in response to changes in taxation.97 The justification also required that each
nation tax the income derived by foreign portfolio investors in the same manner as it
taxed the income of domestic portfolio investors.98 The international mobility of capital,
however, prevents most nations from adopting this approach. 99
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See Barker, supra note 29, at 191-92.
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See Barker, supra note 29, at 193.
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Competitive conditions in capital markets may prevent a nation from taxing the interest income of
foreign investors at all or from maintaining the source-based taxation of portfolio income generally. See
Avi-Yonah, supra note 47 [Globalization], at 1579-86. Furthermore, in a small, open economy, the burden
of a withholding tax on interest income would not fall on the foreign lender’s shareholders. Instead, the
burden would be passed on to the domestic borrower who must then do two things: reduce its demand for
borrowings and reduce its fixed domestic costs, for example, its wage bill. This is the basis for the
recommendation that small, open economies not tax investment income, but tax labor directly (which is
more efficient than taxing labor indirectly through the withholding tax on investment income). See Roger
H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., International Taxation, National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 8854, 4-5 (2002).
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The second traditional justification for the policy appeals to the fairness of
treatment of a resident enterprise and its competitors in foreign markets. The topping off
tax imposed by a nation with a worldwide tax system, so the argument goes, places an
additional burden on its enterprises as they compete in a foreign marketplace against
enterprises subject to no such additional tax.
The justification based on fairness attracts two kinds of criticism. The first kind is
based on the incidence of a corporate income tax. Capital import neutrality assumes that
the incidence of a domestic corporate income tax falls on consumers in the foreign
market and thus affects the competitive position of the enterprise in the foreign market.100
Traditionally, however, the incidence of a corporate income tax was thought to fall on the
corporation’s shareholders. Proponents of capital export neutrality used this traditional
understanding to criticize the policy of capital import neutrality on two grounds. First, a
topping-off tax by the corporation’s home nation would only affect its shareholders’
return on their investment, reducing the corporation’s capitalization in a one-time event
but not otherwise affecting the corporation’s competitive position.101 The corporation
pays the topping-off tax only when it is profitable; its break-even point should not be
affected by a corporate income tax. Second, the corporation’s foreign competitors would
have no incentive to lower prices in the foreign marketplace, because such a strategy
would only lower their own profit margin.102
More recent scholarship suggests that shareholders share the burden of a
corporate income tax with consumers and workers.103 This conclusion suggests that a
topping-off tax may in fact reduce competition in the foreign market place, to the
detriment of consumer welfare.104 Furthermore, GATT decisions that characterize
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See PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 119 (1969).
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See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 144 (5th ed. 1987).
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This argument is an extension of the argument that the policy of taxing nonprofit organizations on their
unrelated business income is misconceived. For the latter argument, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair
Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982); Richard Steinberg, “Unfair”
Competition by Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 351 (1991). The extension of the argument
fails to take into account a for-profit organization’s reduction in its own profit margin as a strategy to gain
market share.
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See PECHMAN, supra note 101, at 141-46. In a closed economy, the burden of a corporate income tax
falls primarily on capital owners. However, in a small, open economy, the burden of a withholding tax on
interest income does not fall on the lender’s shareholders. Instead, the burden is passed on to the borrower
who must then do two things: reduce its demand for borrowings and reduce its fixed domestic costs, for
example, its wage bill. This is the basis for the recommendation that small, open economies not tax
investment income, but tax labor directly (which is more efficient than taxing labor indirectly through the
withholding tax on investment income). See Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., International
Taxation, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8854, 4-5? (2002).
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One effect of a topping off tax could be a reduced variety of goods available to the global market. See
Joel B. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation, 2 INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC
FINANCE 471, 483 (1995) (referring to such a reduction as an efficiency cost).
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targeted income tax subsidies as export subsidies also assume that a corporate income tax
of a home nation affects the workings of foreign markets and not simply the return
enjoyed by the shareholders of an enterprise. GATT outlaws export subsidies because
they skew competition within the market of importation.105
The justification based on fairness attracts a second kind of criticism. This
criticism targets the justification’s over-inclusiveness. Consider the income arising from
the domestic operations of resident enterprises. Taken to its logical conclusion and
without regard to the institutional competence of nations, a policy of fairness for national
champions requires that the income arising from a domestic operation’s export sales be
excluded from domestic taxation if foreign competitors conduct their operations within
an economic environment less burdensome than the domestic economic environment.106
The thrust of the policy is to neutralize some element in the domestic economic
environment so as to eliminate that element as a competitive factor in the resident
enterprise’s global industry. In this instance, capital import neutrality would be a form of
illicit competition by a sovereign. The elimination of a valid element in the domestic
economic environment for the benefit of exporters of goods or services but not for
anyone else in the domestic constituency is a form of export subsidy, i.e., a form of
discrimination that impairs global economic development. The policy of capital import
neutrality simply becomes a rationalization of the self-interest of national champions in
avoiding elements of the national economic environment in which they conduct their
operations.
The institutional competence of nations provides a better foundation for
exemption systems of taxation for foreign business operations. Global welfare benefits
from multiple sovereigns, different national economic environments, and sovereign
competition. Exemption systems improve competition in a host nation’s markets and
respect the host nation’s decisions about capital formation by all enterprises active in its
economic environment.107 The institutional competence of nations in global economic
development limits the use of the policy of capital import neutrality to business
operations. Furthermore, it limits the policy to the income derived by a resident
105

Paul McDaniel identifies three negative effects of export subsidies, including those distributed through
tax subsidies: the skewing of sales away from third-country producers who have a comparative advantage
over the subsidized producers, the missed opportunity by the subsidized producers to achieve new
efficiencies, and possible retaliation by third countries through competing subsidies. See McDaniel, supra
note 51 [Trade Agreements], at 295. Export subsidies may also increase the value of the subsidizing
nation’s currency, reducing the benefit of the subsidy without reducing its cost to the nation’s taxpayers.
See id. at 296.
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As yet, no one has argued that the domestic sales income of a resident enterprise should be exempt from
domestic taxation if its products or services compete with imports. The protectionist impulse is expressed
through countervailing duties, antidumping duties, or safeguard measures.
107

A worldwide system of taxation for business income serves as a unilateral projection of a nation’s
conception of economic development onto the world. See Brown, supra note 54, at 313-14 (discussing the
OECD’s lack of attention to the needs of developing nations and referring to “the hegemony of the
principle of capital export neutrality”).
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enterprise from a foreign operation and thus limits the overly broad nature of the policy’s
justification based on fairness.
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
Nations face problems in collective action as they shape their economic
environments. A collective action problem leads a nation to choose an inferior state of
affairs because it cannot rely on other nations to make the choices necessary for all to
achieve a superior state of affairs. In a collective action problem, the parties’ self-interest
is insufficient to coordinate their choices and achieve the optimum result. We are
concerned with those collective action problems that prevent nations from achieving
strong economic development and cause them to settle for less.
A. Social Norms as the Solution
We solve collective action problems by changing the consequences of the
alternatives faced by decision-makers and by that means coordinating their decisionmaking.108 Although there are several ways to change the consequences of a sovereign
decision-maker’s alternatives, the use of social norms must be the primary method.109
In general, there are five ways to coordinate decision-making about economic
development: markets; longer-term relationships achieved through bargaining; voting
that is binding on dissenters; hierarchy, i.e., the grant of asymmetric and incompletely
defined authority to one decision-maker to direct the decision-making of another; and
social norms. 110 The first four ways are of limited use for the coordination of sovereign
decision-making.
We have already mentioned competition among sovereigns as a means of limiting
the abuse of sovereign discretion. The market in sovereigns, if you will, suffers from
almost prohibitive transaction costs; individuals are unable to move easily among
sovereigns. The resulting segmentation of the market impairs its ability to coordinate
sovereign decision-making. Furthermore, markets are of limited use under conditions of
108
For an elaboration of this point, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 31-35
(1994).
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I define the term “social norm” broadly to include behavioral regularities that maximize value for actors
in cooperative relationships. I differ from Eric Posner, who sometimes limits the denotation of the term to
behavioral regularities that signal an actor’s trustworthiness in cooperative relationships and departures
from which cause the actor to be shunned by others. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 34
(2000) (distinguishing social norms from “behavioral regularities that emerge in cooperative relationships
simply because they are value maximizing”). I agree with Posner that any behavioral regularity that arises
from incomplete information is a social norm. See id. at 41. An actor might continue its cooperative
behavior in the face of incomplete information about its payoff in a particular round of an indefinitely
repeated game in the belief that cooperation maximizes the actor’s payoffs through all rounds of play.
110

This definition of hierarchy comes from MILLER, supra note 6, at 16.
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asymmetric information and interdependent work. Under those conditions, markets must
be supplemented by shared knowledge and cooperation. Those supplements can be
created through hierarchy and social norms.111
Bargaining to create a longer-term relationship between decision-makers is a
second method of coordinating decision-making. Nations enter into treaties to stabilize
their expectations of each other’s behavior. Bargains, however, require hierarchy for
their enforcement when the norms they contain are not self-enforcing. Furthermore,
bargaining can be inefficient in the face of asymmetric information and stalemate over
the division of the efficiency bonus. There are no incentive schemes to which parties will
agree voluntarily that will cause parties to disclose their payoffs.112 Those incentive
schemes must be imposed through hierarchy and social norms.
Voting that is binding on dissenters is a third method of coordinating decisionmaking. Such voting is generally unavailable in a world of sovereign decision-makers,
although binding voting mechanisms are found in some international organizations such
as the European Union. Even when binding voting is available, Arrow’s Theorem tells us
about the shortcomings of such voting as a means of coordinating decision-makers. For
voting to retain both Pareto optimality and coherence (i.e., the transitivity of collective
choices) in the coordination of decision-making, we must restrict the range of voter
preferences.113 In general, we can restrict the preferences of decision-makers through
incentives, through screening the decision-makers whom we admit to the voting process,
and through social norms. Incentives, however, can be impractical to use because of their
expense.114 Screening decision-makers can only be done if we are willing to coordinate
international decision-making on less than a global basis. Social norms may be the only
means of limiting preferences among sovereign decision-makers.
Hierarchy is unavailable as a means of coordinating decision-making in a world
of sovereign decision-makers. We have no central decision-maker who exercises
authority over nations. Without hierarchy, we cannot set up enforcement mechanisms for
markets, bargains, or voting. Nor can we set up proper incentive systems to elicit
otherwise hidden action and hidden information or to restrict the range of preferences.
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See MILLER, supra note 6, at 8-13, 57, 216-18.
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See id., at 47-50 (citing Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral
Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983)).
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This is the Sen paradox. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 86-89 (citing AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE
CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity, and Rights, 43 ECONOMICA 217
(1976); Amartya Sen, Liberty and Social Choice, 80 J. PHILOSOPHY 5 (1983)).
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See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) (cost of incentives to
employees outweighing benefit of increased productivity); see also Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch,
Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 223, 231-35 (1995) (the cost of
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Without hierarchy, we must rely on social norms alone to complete the coordination of
decision-making by markets, bargaining, and voting.
Thus, international social norms are an important part of the solution to
international collective action problems. Social norms are a means of fostering shared
knowledge and cooperative behavior in order to improve global economic development.
Unaided by hierarchy, social norms must carry a heavy burden.
The lack of a central authority over nations has five ramifications for the use of
social norms to coordinate international decision-making in economic development.
First, we have no need to create vertical norms of commitment; without a central
authority, sovereign decision-makers need not fear that their decision-making authority
will be appropriated by the center. Second, we cannot create vertical norms of reciprocal
cooperation and thus cannot use such vertical norms to foster the development of
horizontal social norms. Third, we cannot create property rights that facilitate the
creation of appropriate horizontal social norms. Nations must create those norms without
the benefit of property rights set by a central authority.115 Fourth, we cannot enforce
horizontal norms, once they arise, by a hierarchy. Fifth, without a central authority, we
can model the collective action problems of nations by repeated game theory.
The appropriate social norms will extend the time horizon of nations as decisionmakers. The appropriate norms include norms of reciprocated cooperation and
reciprocated effort; the norms must address externalities and hidden action in interdependent work. The norms must also address the problem of hidden knowledge; a
nation may need information to enforce its laws that is possessed by another nation.
Social norms that coordinate sovereign decision-making in our pursuit of global
economic development become part of the standards and limitations we develop for the
exercise of sovereign discretion. The standards for and limitations on the design of
national economic environments are social norms, and they counter both abuses of
sovereign discretion and international collective action problems.
1. Anti-Deferral Regimes. A national income tax code generally does not tax a
resident entity’s foreign subsidiaries. At most, a tax code waits until the subsidiaries
distribute their income to the resident entity and taxes the income at that time. The tax
code is said to defer the taxation of a foreign subsidiary’s income until the income is
repatriated. An anti-deferral regime is a set of provisions in a national tax code that
overrides the deferral of tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries. When the regime
applies, the tax code taxes the income of foreign subsidiaries to the resident entity
without delay.
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For an elaboration of the use of property rights by a central authority to foster horizontal social norms,
see MILLER, supra note 6, at 211 (management creating property rights for self-directed work teams in
order to foster the development of good horizontal norms within those work teams).
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Anti-deferral regimes are said to embody a dilemma. When they apply and tax
the income of foreign subsidiaries currently, the regimes advance a policy of tax
neutrality in the choice of location in which to conduct a business operation, either
domestic or foreign, and in the choice of entity, either a subsidiary or a branch. When the
anti-deferral regimes do not apply and the national tax codes defer the taxation of the
income of foreign subsidiaries, the regimes advance a policy of promoting the
competitiveness of foreign subsidiaries in their marketplaces. The two policies of tax
neutrality and competitiveness are said to be irreconcilable, with the anti-deferral regime
being a pawn in the battle between advocates of the two policies.
The dilemma is only apparent, however. Once we recall that our overall goal is
the well-being of the world’s people, and once we realize that global economic
development is necessary to achieve that goal, the dilemma falls away. Global economic
development becomes the higher objective that orders the relationship between warring
policies. Our objective of global economic development calls for a set of autonomous
decision-makers on the same plane of authority, serves as a brief for those decisionmakers, and sets standards for and limitations on the exercise of their discretion. Those
standards and limitations specify the general outlines of national tax codes to minimize
the exploitation of individuals and to reduce opportunism in international relations. The
brief for global economic development and the set of standards and limitations partly
define the competence of nations.
Recall the primary norms that the standards and limitations suggest for the
international taxation of business and investment income. For business income, a nation
may tax only the income from business operations conducted within its own economic
environment. A nation is not to tax the income of foreign branches and subsidiaries.
Furthermore, a nation is to apply uniform rates of taxation to all business income and not
grant preferential rates to the income of foreign-owned business operations. For portfolio
income, a nation may tax the worldwide investment income of its residents. A nation is
not to tax the portfolio income of foreign investors.
What function do anti-deferral regimes serve under these norms of international
taxation? In particular, does the adoption of exemption systems of taxation for business
income eliminate the need for anti-deferral regimes? No. When our goal is global
economic development, anti-deferral regimes define impermissible tax avoidance and
solve collective action problems in the enforcement of national tax law. From this point
of view, anti-deferral regimes are a species of anti-avoidance regime. A nation’s antideferral regime supports its taxpayers’ compliance with their national tax code and, by
solving collective action problems in the enforcement of other nations’ tax codes,
supports compliance with those other tax codes.
Anti-deferral regimes have five functions to serve. First, the regimes must police
the diversion of business income from its economic environment to another taxing
jurisdiction. Thus, income-extractive arrangements and income-shifting arrangements
are properly within the ambit of anti-deferral regimes. Second, anti-deferral regimes
must police attempts to change the apparent residence of an investor through the
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interposition of an entity between the investor and its portfolio income. As a result,
income-holding arrangements and the taxation of income from liquid passive assets
would also fall within the ambit of anti-deferral regimes. Third, anti-deferral regimes
may be used to neutralize the effect of preferential tax regimes.116 Fourth, anti-deferral
regimes may address the income from business operations that are difficult to allocate to
any nation’s economic environment. The income from the operation of highly mobile
business assets, such as ships or satellites, would fall within the scope of anti-deferral
regimes. Fifth, for nations with classical systems of corporate and individual income
taxation, anti-deferral regimes may police the de facto distribution of profits without the
declaration of a formal dividend or through the sale of the shareholder’s investment in the
multinational enterprise.117 Some of these functions address collective action problems
themselves, while others, perhaps all, give rise to collective action problems in their
enforcement. The first two of these functions are discussed below.
A nation’s anti-deferral regime may take any of several forms. Some nations
target income subject to a low rate of foreign tax.118 Others target income that arises in a
nation appearing on their list of suspect jurisdictions.119 Two nations use neither a tax
rate nor a list of nations, but instead identify income by the type of transaction giving rise
to the income.120 Nations that do not use a low rate of tax to identify potentially diverted
income may apply a high-tax kickout, that is, exempting income from their anti-deferral
regimes if it was subject to a high rate of foreign tax. There are other possible
structures.121
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than an imputed dividend model. Under a flow-through model, losses and the underlying character of
income flow through to the shareholder. A deduction for host-country income taxes is not created. Peroni,
Fleming, and Shay would not retain a minimum ownership requirement. See Robert J. Peroni et al.,

42

A Foundation for International Taxation

(a) The Diversion of Business Income. The standards and limitations suggest
that business income ought to fall within the exclusive taxing jurisdiction of the nation in
whose economic environment the underlying business operation was conducted.
Taxpayers, however, may attempt to shift the apparent origin of their business income
away from its economic environment to a lower-tax jurisdiction. Their attempts may be
categorized as either income-extracting arrangements or income-shifting arrangements.
Income-extracting arrangements rely on intercorporate deductions within the
multinational group to extract income from the high-tax jurisdictions in which it was
earned and reposition the income in lower-tax jurisdictions. Income is paid out as
deductible interest, rent, or royalties. Subsidiaries are capitalized mainly with debt and
are leased or licensed the assets necessary for their operations. A single business might
be unbundled into separate activities and divided among different tax jurisdictions. For
example, a business’ intellectual property can be segregated into a separate entity charged
with managing the income stream thus created from in-house licensing fees. Recalling
the separation of a vacuum into matter and anti-matter, some taxpayers create paired but
completely offsetting risks within a corporate family and, through derivative contracts
between family members, divert income from one jurisdiction to another. A tax haven
company might be used as an intermediate holding company to receive dividends and
deductible payments.
National tax codes counter income-extracting arrangements by limiting the
deductions and deferral necessary for the extractive techniques to work. For example,
cross-border interest deductions might be limited for thinly capitalized subsidiaries.122
Interest payments might be recharacterized as non-deductible dividends. Or, the income
of an intermediate holding company might be imputed to the ultimate parent company.
Income-shifting arrangements, on the other hand, usually employ simple transfer
pricing abuse. Transactions with outside customers or clients are booked to tax haven
entities even though the work producing the income from those transactions is performed
by other entities in higher-tax jurisdictions. Income shifting arrangements are illustrated
well by the facts of the Du Pont case.123 Du Pont created a Swiss subsidiary to handle its
European marketing and sales. Du Pont would sell products to the Swiss subsidiary,
which in turn would sell the products to independent European distributors. By design,
the transfer pricing Du Pont used with its Swiss subsidiary was to leave the lion’s share
of the combined companies’ profit in Switzerland. Switzerland had a preferential tax
regime that taxed the Swiss subsidiary’s income only lightly. Because of the transfer
Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455,
507-12 (1999).
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The United States tax code accomplishes this through the earnings stripping rules of section 163. See
I.R.C. § 163(j).
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Du Pont de Nemours, Inc. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cls. 1979). This pre-Subpart F case arose
under Code section 482.
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pricing used, the Swiss subsidiary’s income included part of the parent’s manufacturing
income as well as the parent’s sales income.
National tax codes counter income-shifting arrangements by limiting the transfer
pricing and deferral necessary for the techniques to work. Tax administrators might
reallocate income away from the tax haven entity to better reflect the relative
contributions of related entities to the completion of a contract. Or, the income booked to
tax haven subsidiaries might be imputed to the ultimate parent company.
Transfer-pricing rules frequently are ineffective. Rules that are based on armslength pricing among entities are stymied by the contributions of proprietary intangibles
and group economies in transaction costs.124 Profit-split methods are more realistic, but
encounter problems as nations use inconsistent formulas. Anti-deferral regimes exist in
part because of the significant problems with transfer pricing rules. By imputing the
income of a foreign subsidiary to a parent company, an anti-deferral regime creates quite
roughly a consolidated entity.
Unfortunately, anti-deferral regimes are unsatisfactory as well. Anti-deferral
regimes are necessarily blunt weapons, overriding the uncertainties of transfer pricing
and subjective intent. As blunt weapons, however, they capture and penalize ordinary
business arrangements made by the unwary. For example, the anti-deferral rules that
target the income shifted to regional holding companies also capture ordinary
intercorporate loans and leases. Just as with transfer-pricing rules, we have problems
with the inconsistent treatment of income by nations. Anti-deferral regimes also can be
quite complex, leading to an unanticipated interplay with other taxing provisions.125
Furthermore, anti-deferral regimes fall victim to a serious collective action
problem. International law allocates among nations general prescriptive jurisdiction over
companies in such a way that a nation may apply its anti-deferral regime only against its
own multinational groups. A nation cannot apply its anti-deferral regime against transfer
pricing abuses of a foreign-based multinational enterprise, even though it might affect its
own tax collections from the domestic member of the group. This limitation requires
each nation to impede income-shifting arrangements of its own multinational groups that
affect other nations’ tax bases, even when the arrangements do not affect its own tax
base.
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Accurate transfer pricing would also reflect the degree of decentralization at the organization and the
attendant incentive structure for division managers. See Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Transfer Pricing
and Organizational Form, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 201, 202-203 (1991).
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According to Charlie Kingson, U.S. multinational enterprises can now avoid two important features of
the U.S. anti-deferral regime by the use of that nation’s check-the-box regulations: the inclusion within
foreign personal holding company income of intra-group returns from non-portfolio investment and the
inclusion of income from transactions with foreign related persons. See Charles I. Kingson, Leonardo da
Vinci and the 861 Regulations, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1565, 1569-70 (2001).
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For example, the United States’ anti-deferral regime cannot reach diversionary
transactions between the subsidiaries of a German parent corporation, one of which is
incorporated within the United States. At most, the United States can use its transfer
pricing rules and provisions for the denial of deductions. Only the nation with
prescriptive jurisdiction over the parent corporation can apply its anti-deferral regime to
the entities controlled by the parent. The United States must depend on Germany’s antideferral regime to back up the American transfer pricing rules. Conversely, Germany
must rely on the United States’ anti-deferral regime to back up its transfer pricing rules in
the case of transactions to which a German subsidiary of a United States parent
corporation is a party.
Not all nations will institute anti-deferral regimes. Nations wanting to attract the
parent companies of multinational enterprises as residents will refrain from doing so.
Multinational enterprises can then avoid anti-deferral regimes through the use of such
headquarters tax havens.126 Changing the definition of residence might not solve the
problem of the expatriation of companies to headquarters tax havens.127
The formulary apportionment of a multinational group’s income among nations
would solve the problem of expatriation by eliminating the need for the concept of
corporate residence. Furthermore, ideal formulary apportionment would eliminate the
need for international transfer pricing rules and the need for anti-deferral regimes to
address income-shifting transactions. We will consider formulary apportionment shortly,
after we examine the use of anti-deferral regimes to counter the diversion of portfolio
income.
(b) The Diversion of Portfolio Income. The standards and limitations suggest
that portfolio income ought to fall within the exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction of the
nation of which the investor is a resident. The investor’s nation of residence is entitled to
tax the investor’s worldwide portfolio income. However, an investor might transfer her
portfolio investment assets to an entity resident in another nation in an attempt to the take
advantage of the other nation’s lower tax rates on investment income. The arrangement
diverts portfolio income away from the investor and into a holding entity owned by the
investor. Nations thwart this maneuver by means of their anti-deferral regimes. The
entity’s portfolio income is imputed to the investor, or the investor is charged interest
until the investor repatriates the income. The appreciation in value of the investment
assets might also be taxed to the investor at the time the investor initially transfers the
assets out of the jurisdiction.
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See Avi-Yonah, supra note 47[Globalization], at 1665-66.
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Unfortunately, an investor may mask her identity through the use of a conduit tax
haven and thus avoid the exchange-of-information obligations between the nation paying
the portfolio income and the investor’s nation of residence.128
2. Formulary Apportionment. A foundation for international taxation must
allocate business income derived by a multinational enterprise among the nations in
which the enterprise operates. The standards for and limitations on the exercise of
sovereign discretion have already suggested that nations should adopt exemption systems
for the taxation of international business income. Exemption systems require that
business income be allocated among nations on the basis of the location of the business
operation that generated the income.
Traditionally, an enterprise’s business income has been allocated among nations
according to rules classifying the income according to type; rules based on that
classification that identify the nations that are the source of the income; rules that allocate
deductions among nations; rules that define the presence of a business operation, or
permanent establishment, in a nation; and rules that attribute types of income to a
permanent establishment. Rules of transfer pricing correct the division of income among
related taxpayers. (Additional rules govern the manner in which income is taxed by a
nation once the income is identified with a particular nation.) Such rules of classification,
source, permanent establishment, and attribution are adjusted by the terms of tax treaties,
when a treaty applies.
The traditional approach assumes that a multinational enterprise is a collection of
legally separate entities that operate and are managed autonomously. Each subsidiary
operates a separate business and frequently in only one nation, is managed independently
from the other formal entities within the multinational enterprise, and deals with those
other entities at arm’s length, as if those entities conducted independent businesses.
Branches, if they exist, are frequently imagined to be separate entities. The rules are
geared to legal entities and, moreover, to legal entities that operate, and are managed,
distinctly from one another.
The traditional approach fails to appreciate the economics of organization for
many multinational enterprises. First, the multinational enterprise is not a collection of
independently managed subsidiaries dealing with one another at arm’s length. The
competitive advantage of the complex organization over a collection of independent
actors in the market place is the organization’s ability, through hierarchy, to reduce the
transaction costs incurred by the loose collection of market actors.129 Arms-length
transfer pricing misses the income attributable to the enterprise’s ability to reduce the
transaction costs of the marketplace.130
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See id. at 1665. Part IV.B.2 infra proposes a secondary norm of international taxation to respond to this
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Second, one of the transaction costs reduced by the multinational form of
enterprise is the cost of protecting intangibles through licensing agreements with outside
persons. When the terms of licensing agreements cannot protect an enterprise’s
intangibles at reasonable cost, the entity itself must undertake the international use of its
intangibles.131 This in-house use of intangibles makes transfer pricing difficult; the
unique nature of intangibles make comparisons difficult for purposes of pricing.
Third, the structure of the management of a multinational enterprise’s operations
does not follow the structure of its ownership of its subsidiaries. It is true that a
multinational enterprise must delegate decision-making authority to autonomous actors,
subject to standards and limitations. However, the multi-divisional form that the
management of a multinational enterprise usually takes groups sets of subsidiaries
together and operates them in an integrated fashion.132 The internal reporting of the
multinational enterprise follows the management structure rather than the ownership
structure. The entity-specific accounting of the enterprise can be an afterthought.
Thus, transfer pricing is a serious problem for the traditional approach. The
operations of a multinational enterprise may be easily attributed to specific nations, but
the income of those operations might not. The traditional approach also encounters the
problem of inconsistent national rules for defining permanent establishments, classifying
income, identifying the source of income, and attributing income to permanent
establishments. Tax treaties give bilateral solutions to the definition of permanent
establishments, and advance pricing agreements give limited relief for the problem of
transfer pricing, but the other problems remain.
In principle, a promising approach is the formulary apportionment of a
multinational enterprise’s income among the nations in which it operates. Such an
approach determines the aggregate taxable income of a multinational enterprise and then
allocates that income according to a formula among the nations in which its operations
are located.133 The participating nations must agree on the factors taken into account by
the formula and the weighting the factors are to have in the formula. One approach
131

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [Institutions], at 290-94, 296 (transaction cost economics suggesting
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safeguard their intangibles through long-term contracts).
132
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would allocate income among nations on the basis of sales, labor costs, assets, and
research and development costs.134 The inclusion of research and development costs
would capture the contribution of intangibles to the production of the enterprise’s
income.135 The portfolio income earned by a corporation could be added to its business
income and taxed by source, that is, by apportioning the income among nations according
to an international formula.136
Formulary apportionment would eliminate the need for rules governing transfer
pricing, the classification of income, the determination of the source of income, and the
residence of a corporation.137 By eliminating the need to determine a corporation’s
residence, formulary apportionment addresses the vulnerability of anti-deferral regimes to
the expatriation of parent companies to headquarters tax havens. Furthermore, formulary
apportionment would eliminate the need to track inter-corporate payments within the
multinational enterprise. Moreover, formulary apportionment could be used to define the
concept of permanent establishment.138 A permanent establishment could be deemed to
exist in a nation if the formula allocates to that nation more than a pre-determined amount
of the enterprise’s income. Below that amount, de minimis by definition, a nation would
134

See Graetz, supra note 54, at 319-20. For another proposal for international formulary apportionment,
see Avi-Yonah, supra note 69 [Simplification], at 1348-49. The proposal to include sales as a factor in the
apportioning formula would permit a nation in which the enterprise sells its products or services without a
sales operation to tax part of the enterprise’s income. This contrasts with the traditional approach, which
requires a sales operation or other permanent establishment in a nation before the nation may tax the sales
income of a non-resident enterprise. Several commentators have argued that the domestic consumption of
imported goods and services should be a basis for a nation’s taxation of income. Stephen Shay, Cliff
Fleming, and Robert Peroni argue that a source-based tax can be justified as the price of access to a
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International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 91-93 (2002). Michael Graetz puts it differently. He first
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Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 544-45
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had no sales operation within its jurisdiction by means of a withholding tax on sales. Avi-Yonah, supra
note 47 [Globalization], at 1672-74.
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not tax the enterprise on its income.139 Formulary apportionment coupled with
exemption systems would also permit the elimination of the foreign tax credit, parts of
anti-deferral regimes, the branch profits tax, and the earnings stripping rule.140
Formulary apportionment must be implemented on a multilateral basis.
Enterprises are unlikely to agree to formulary apportionment unless all nations in which
an enterprise operates participate and do so on a uniform basis. For the simplest
multinational enterprises, formulary apportionment could be introduced through advance
pricing agreements, to which typically only two nations are party.
Unfortunately, the implementation of formulary apportionment runs into a
virtually insurmountable problem. Participating nations must agree on a common
definition of the enterprise’s taxable income. This requires agreement on the definitions
of gross income and deductions and the treatment of losses. In particular, participating
nations must agree on depreciation schedules for the enterprise. In effect, formulary
apportionment requires harmonization of national tax codes, a task open to anticompetitive abuse and requiring Herculean effort.141
Without formulary apportionment, we are left with the traditional approach to
exemption systems, which requires the attribution of income to permanent
establishments. Losses would not be deductible unless they were attributable to the
permanent establishment.
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Reuven Avi-Yonah would define a permanent establishment as a minimum level of sales into a
jurisdiction. Avi-Yonah, supra note 47 [Globalization], at 1671.
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3. Tax Treaties. Tax treaties are a means of solving collective action problems
through the conscious creation of social norms. Tax treaties adjust the allocation among
nations of prescriptive jurisdiction over the global tax base through the coordination of
primary norms of taxation and the withdrawal of secondary norms of taxation.
Almost all tax treaties in existence today are bilateral. Most of these treaties are
based on the common model sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). The OECD model is a significant source of multilateral
coordination in the exercise by nations of prescriptive jurisdiction over the global tax
base. 142 The use of multilateral treaties is taken up later in this Article.143
Tax treaties can be analyzed in terms of transaction-cost economics. In general,
transaction-cost economics aligns transactions with governance structures to economize
on bounded rationality and to reduce transaction costs, including the costs of
opportunism.144 Tax treaties serve as governance structures with regard to the parties’
transactions in prescriptive jurisdiction. Tax treaties are enhanced versions of
Williamson’s hybrid governance structures, because the treaty partners cannot seek
judicial intervention as a last resort but must rely entirely on the mechanisms they create
in their treaties and on follow-up negotiations.145
In a sense, the partners to a tax treaty find themselves in a bilateral monopoly.
They share a highly specific asset: the tax base of income flows that cross their common
border.146 This analogy with a bilateral monopoly is not complete, however. If the
partners cannot agree to a division of their common tax base, they will both use the entire
shared tax base, which leads to over-taxation of their common asset. In this sense, the
treaty partners share a two-person commons. Over-taxation may result in diminished
returns for the two governments.147
Tax treaties generally are used to limit the source-based taxation of investment
income in favor of residence-based taxation, to eliminate source-based taxation of de
minimis amounts of business income, to eliminate overlapping definitions of tax
142

See Hugh J. Ault, The Importance of International Cooperation in Forging Tax Policy, 26 BROOKLYN J.
INT’L L. 1693, 1694 (2001).
143

See part IV.B.3 infra.

144

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2 [Mechanisms], at 12 (the discriminating alignment hypothesis);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [Institutions], at 32, 72-79 (economizing on bounded rationality and
safeguarding against opportunism).
145

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2 [Mechanisms], at 10, 95-97; WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [Institutions],
at 70-71.
146

See WILLIAMSON, supra note 14 [Institutions], at 52-56.

147

See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (overuse of a commons
leading to diminished returns for all users).

50

A Foundation for International Taxation
residence, and for the exchange of information about taxpayers. Tax treaties also contain
nondiscrimination clauses. Such clauses prevent a nation’s retaliation against non-treaty
nations from affecting the enterprises of its treaty partners.
B. The Enforcement of Social Norms
Without a central authority to enforce social norms, we must rely on selfenforcing norms and norms of punishment. A self-enforcing social norm relies for its
continued existence on each participant’s belief that others will continue to observe the
norm only as long as the participant observes the norm and that the benefits to the
participant from the norm outweigh the costs.148 In this sense, social norms are mutually
reinforcing expectations of others’ behavior.149 In a world of social convention, an actor
must be concerned about the effect that its behavior has on others. In perfectly
competitive markets, an actor cannot move the market, and hence its behavior has no
effect on other participants.
Social norms that are not self-enforcing must rely on norms of punishment for
their observance. Norms of punishment subject the offending nation to different
treatment by other nations. To the extent that the standards for and limitations on
sovereign discretion are not self-enforcing, we will need a second set of social norms that
nations apply in their dealings with nations who fail to observe the standards and
limitations. Different treatment would include retaliation through the imposition of
externalities on those nations, externalities that would shift the balance among the
offending nation’s interest groups to favor compliance with the primary norms. The
second set of norms change the offending nation’s payoffs in favor of the standards and
limitations. This second set of social norms must be self-enforcing, that is, it must be in
the self-interest of the enforcing nations to impose the norms of punishment in their
dealings with an offending nation.150
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We might view the rules of customary international law as self-enforcing social norms. We can then
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The social norms embodied by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) are illustrative. A primary norm of GATT forbids the use of export subsidies by
member nations. In the event that a member nation enacts an export subsidy, other
members may invoke a secondary norm: each member that imports subsidized goods
from the offending member may impose a countervailing duty on those imports. The
countervailing duty is limited; it cannot exceed the amount of the export subsidy. The
permitted retaliation is measured, unlike the retaliation that might be imposed on a nonmember nation.
Thus, GATT envisions three levels of treatment for a nation. Member nations
that respect the primary norm banning export subsidies see their exports flow unimpeded
by countervailing duties. Member nations that subsidize their exports are subject to
measured countervailing duties. Non-members that subsidize their exports are subject to
arbitrary retaliation.
In contrast, tax treaties envision only two levels of treatment for a nation. Parties
that abide by the terms of a tax treaty enjoy limitations on the foreign taxation of their
residents’ income. Parties that do not abide by the terms of a tax treaty or who are not
parties to a tax treaty enjoy no such limitations. Tax treaties do not include norms of
measured retaliation. Most tax treaties are bilateral; a multilateral tax treaty would permit
us to create secondary norms of measured retaliation to enforce primary norms of
international taxation.
The secondary norms of GATT are self-enforcing; interest groups within
retaliating nations provide the pressure. We must only be concerned with retaliation that
fails to remain within the bounds set by GATT. The pressure brought by interest groups
on the national decision-makers of GATT members is so strong at times that it threatens
members’ own compliance with GATT’s primary norms.151
A mechanism for resolving disputes about appropriate levels of treatment can be
advantageous in maintaining social norms. The dispute resolution mechanism of GATT
is illustrative. GATT permits member nations to impose countervailing duties that
conform to its terms.
The European Union might have unilaterally imposed
countervailing duties on imports from the United States to offset the export subsidies the
union perceived in the U.S. tax code. Instead, GATT first required the European Union
to protest the perceived export subsidies through the GATT dispute resolution
mechanism. Such a protest ultimately brings an end to the dispute about whether the U.S.
Monetary Fund are indirectly enforced by the international market for sovereign debt, which will refuse to
reschedule existing debt or extend additional credit to sovereigns in default of an IMF loan agreement.
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tax code violates a primary norm of GATT and prevents a subsequent dispute about the
propriety of any countervailing duties.
Social norms and mechanisms for the resolution of disputes allow nations to form
stable expectations about each other’s behavior. Social norms extend each nation’s area
of rationality by increasing the range of alternatives that a sovereign can consider. The
increased range of alternatives counters some of the inevitable incompleteness in making
decisions.152 Arbitral decisions change the environment for sovereign decision-making,
by directing an offending sovereign’s attention in its law-making. In so doing, arbitral
decisions assist in the integration of nations’ behavior in the face of collective action
problems.153
Three questions arise in the evaluation of any secondary norm. First, to what
degree is the secondary norm self-enforcing, that is, how likely is it that other nations will
impose the secondary norm? This question includes a consideration of the interest
groups in a retaliating nation that would press for the application of the secondary norm.
Second, to what extent will the secondary norm cause offending nations to comply with
the primary norm? This question includes a consideration of the interest groups within
the offending nation that would lobby for compliance with the primary norm once they
come under pressure from the secondary norm. Third, compared to other candidates for a
secondary norm, will the secondary norm do the least harm to our overall objective of
global economic development for the well-being of the world’s people?
1. Secondary Norms for the Taxation of Business Income. When a nation
departs from the primary norms for the taxation of business income, what are the
appropriate secondary norms for other nations to apply? As a response to a nation that
enacts a preferential tax regime, other nations might be permitted to impose offsetting
import duties on products and services exported by the offending nation. This secondary
norm would require coordination with the norms of GATT. The appropriate response to
a nation that taxes the income of its residents’ foreign operations might be the denial to
the offending nation of the benefits under a proposed multinational tax treaty of the
exchange of information and exemption from other nations’ default withholding taxes on
portfolio income. These and other alternatives are discussed below.
(a) Countering Preferential Tax Regimes. The standards and limitations require
that a nation treat foreign-owned business operations no better and no worse than locally
owned business operations. We referred to this conclusion as the tax norm of national
treatment for foreign-owned business activity.154 This primary tax norm would prohibit
preferential tax regimes for foreign investment.
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A foreign investor might elicit a preferential tax regime by its solicitation of bids
from several nations for its investment. A nation might offer a preferential tax regime in
order to match the bids made by other nations. An effective secondary norm would
require nations to lower uncompetitive general tax rates to attract foreign investment,
instead of offering preferential tax regimes available only to a foreign investor.
The appropriate secondary norm would offset the benefit of a preferential tax
regime. There are two alternatives to consider. First, we could permit the foreign
investor’s home nation to tax the business income derived under a host nation’s
preferential tax regime. The home nation’s rate of tax would be limited to the difference
between the host nation’s general rate of taxation and its preferential rate. This current
taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries operating under a preferential tax regime
offsets the tax preference.
Would this proposed secondary norm be effective? Competitors in the retaliating
nation should support the imposition of the secondary norm. In nations the social welfare
system of which depends on an individual being employed, labor groups would be a
second group supporting the secondary norm. What is unclear is whether the secondary
norm would pressure the offending nation to change its behavior. No interest groups
within the offending nation would be affected by this kind of retaliation. Furthermore,
it’s unclear whether the retaliating nation would tax the foreign subsidiary or branch of
one of its own multinational enterprises in the face of inaction by other nations.
The second method of offsetting the benefit of a preferential tax regime takes
advantage of the GATT regime of cross-retaliation to pressure interest groups within the
offending nation to lobby for repeal of the preferential tax regime. Nations that import
goods or services from the offending nation might impose countervailing duties on those
imports, regardless of whether those imports were produced with the benefit of the
preferential tax regime. The indiscriminate imposition of duties would help to ensure that
interest groups within the offending nation lobbied for the removal of the preferential tax
regime. We might need to modify the terms of GATT and GATS to define the benefit of
any preferential tax regime as an export subsidy.
(b) Countering Residence-Based Taxation of Business Income. The
standards and limitations suggest that a nation should refrain from taxing the income of
its residents’ foreign branches and subsidiaries (other than under its anti-abuse regime).
The taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries is of concern only to host nations with
lower tax rates than a multinational enterprise’s home nation. Host nations with tax rates
comparable to or higher than the home nation would see no effect from the residencebased tax system due to the workings of the home nation’s foreign tax credit. Nations
with lower tax rates include many with emerging markets.
To curb the taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries, we must offer nations a
treaty benefit that is contingent upon the adoption of an exemption system for the
taxation of business income and that is withdrawn in the event that the nation reverts to
the taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries. Two treaty benefits relating to the
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taxation of portfolio income fill our need: the exchange of taxpayer information and the
elimination of the substantial withholding tax on portfolio income discussed below. A
treaty party that reintroduced the taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries would see
its residents’ portfolio income burdened by a substantial withholding tax imposed by the
advanced economies and would also see its own tax on portfolio income absorbed by its
foreign tax credit and by tax evasion as it lost access to the information it needed to
enforce its own tax on portfolio income.
The imposition of a substantial withholding tax would be ineffective unless all of
the advanced economies were committed to do so on behalf of affected low-tax nations.
Otherwise, interest groups within the offending nation would simply shift their portfolio
investment to other nations. In addition, debtor nations, a category that includes many
developing countries, would be reluctant to impose such a retaliatory withholding tax.
Under typical international loan agreements, lenders charge any withholding taxes on
their interest income to their borrowers. Thus, a retaliatory withholding tax would pit
borrowers in the retaliating nation against the competitive position of the injured nation’s
tax on business income. For these reasons, the suspension of the exchange of taxpayer
information by itself might be the likely form of retaliation.
An alternative secondary norm is the blocking statute, a form of retaliation that
can be imposed unilaterally.155 A blocking statute forbids the repatriation of earnings by
foreign subsidiaries or branches; the ban prevents the parent company from repatriating
earnings with which to pay the tax levied by the home nation on the multinational
group’s foreign operations. A blocking statute has been sufficient to eliminate the U.S.
tax liability of a U.S. parent company.156 However, the frequent use of blocking statutes
by host nations may lead home nations to ignore them and impose liability for tax
regardless of the parent company’s inability to repatriate the foreign income. Such a
move would encounter internal resistance from the home nation’s business groups.
Blocking statutes also may run afoul of bilateral investment treaties, which frequently
require the free repatriation of earnings by foreign investors.
2. A Secondary Norm for the Taxation of Portfolio Income. The primary norm
for the taxation of portfolio income stipulates that a nation has exclusive prescriptive
jurisdiction over the portfolio income of its residents. A nation may not tax the portfolio
income of another nation’s residents. When a nation departs from this primary norm and
taxes the portfolio income of nonresidents, what is the appropriate secondary norm for
other nations to follow? Other nations would be permitted to retaliate in two ways: first,
by their conditional imposition of a substantial withholding tax on the portfolio income of
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the offending nation’s own residents; and second, by the suspension of their treaty
obligations to exchange information with the offending nation.
The retaliation would reduce the offending nation’s tax collections from its own
residents. If the offending nation offers a foreign tax credit to its own residents, the
retaliation would transfer tax revenue from the offending nation to the retaliating nations.
If the offending nation does not offer its residents a foreign tax credit and thus the
retaliatory tax threatens to increase the tax burden on the offending nation’s residents, the
suspension of the exchange of information permits the offending nation’s residents to
evade their own nation’s taxation of their portfolio income.
Nations could incorporate the secondary norm into their national tax codes as a
default provision, that is, as a permanent provision that would be overridden by a nation’s
treaties as long as each treaty is honored. The withholding tax would apply to all
payments of portfolio income made to addresses in non-treaty nations, including
addresses in nations that did not engage in effective exchange of information. The
withholding tax would also deter conduit arrangements through opaque tax havens and
thus improve tax compliance in residence nations, if the rate at which the withholding tax
is set exceeds the highest marginal rate on portfolio income set by capital exporting
nations.157 In this way, the withholding tax serves as the secondary norm for another
primary norm of international taxation: the primary norm requiring transparency in the
administration of a nation’s tax code so that other nations may verify the foreign portfolio
income of their residents.
Would this secondary norm be effective? The widespread use of withholding
taxes on nonresidents’ portfolio income suggests that nations are not at all reluctant to
impose such a withholding tax. After all, nonresident taxpayers don’t vote. One possible
exception is a withholding tax on interest payments to nonresidents. Resident debtors
would argue against the reimposition of a withholding tax on interest payments, because
under the typical international loan agreement any withholding tax on the lender’s
interest payments is charged to the borrower. The effectiveness of the secondary norm
will turn on the willingness of offending governments to remove withholding taxes on
portfolio income in exchange for an improved flow of information about (and improved
flow of tax revenue from) their resident taxpayers.158 Financial institutions within the
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offending nation will be one source of pressure to drop the offending nation’s
withholding tax.
A multilateral treaty would be helpful for four reasons. First, a multilateral treaty
is required to impose a withholding tax on interest income.159 Such a tax could not be
imposed unilaterally, given the current lack of withholding on portfolio interest income.
No nation would be willing to see inflows of portfolio investment diverted to other
nations. Second, a multilateral treaty would assist in the creation of a regime for the
exchange of tax information among nations. Under the terms of a multilateral treaty,
information received by one nation from another could in turn be passed on to a third
nation. Third, a multilateral treaty would be required to create a refundable withholding
tax. A refundable withholding tax can reinforce a regime for the exchange of
information. An investor resident in a treaty nation would be able to obtain a refund of
the withholding tax by reporting its portfolio income to its nation of residence.160 An
investor resident in a tax haven would receive no refund, if the tax haven were not a party
to the multilateral treaty. Multilateral action would be required to create the necessary
clearinghouse among nations for refunds to investors and net tax collections to nations.
Tax-exempt organizations and tax-exempt collective investment vehicles such as pension
funds could receive a full refund of the tax. Fourth, a multilateral treaty would ease the
transition away from the reciprocity found in bilateral treaties in reductions in
withholding taxes.161
3. A Multilateral Treaty and Collective Action Problems. A multinational treaty
would be useful in the creation of effective secondary norms of measured retaliation to
enforce the primary norms of international taxation. Such a treaty would set out the
primary norms so that the proper application of the secondary norms is known.162
Furthermore, the treaty could establish a mechanism for the resolution of disputes about
whether violations of the primary norms have occurred and about the proper use of the
secondary norms.163 This structure of primary norms, secondary norms of measured
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retaliation, and a dispute resolution mechanism is already present in GATT, which
suggests that we might take the approach of incorporating within GATT the terms of a
multinational tax treaty.164
A multilateral treaty would also be useful in the creation of a multilateral
withholding tax on portfolio income, a refund mechanism for the withholding tax, and
multilateral information exchange. The tax treaty could take the form of a pluralateral
treaty chiefly among OECD members, who together are the primary location for portfolio
investment.
A drawback of a multilateral treaty, however, is the opportunity its negotiation
presents for collusion among sovereigns to engage in anti-competitive behavior, such as
an agreement to harmonize tax rates.
V. SUMMARY
This Article proposes the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development as a foundation for international tax law. A notion of constrained sovereign
discretion lies at the heart of the proposal.
The Article constructs the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development from institutional economics, simple game theory, and the literature on
social norms. The Article expresses the institutional competence of nations through
standards and limitations that reduce the abuse of sovereign discretion and address
international collective action problems in the pursuit of global economic development.
These standards and limitations allocate prescriptive jurisdiction among nations over the
global income tax base.
The Article began its project by reviewing the value to global economic
development of the use of multiple, autonomous decision-makers to shape the world’s
economic environment. The use of multiple, sovereign decision-makers gives us, among
other benefits, sovereign competition and a variety of approaches in the design of
national economic environments. A variety of approaches is essential because it enables
us to use the comparative method to evaluate the relative efficacy of different economic
treaty shopping, and triangular tax treaty problems. See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation
and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1641, 1644, 1651, 1654-55, 1661-1662 (2001); Diane
M. Ring, Prospects for a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1699, 1701 n. 3 (2001).
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environments, thus partly overcoming our inherent lack of information about
endowments, our inability to use controlled experiments in the public sphere, and the
inevitable incompleteness of decision-making. Hence, the institutional competence of
nations ratifies the existence of sovereign discretion in global economic development.
Nations can abuse their sovereign discretion, however. The immediate needs of a
nation’s public decision-makers and the efforts of organized groups to ameliorate market
conditions can be causes of such abuse. The design of institutions within a nation’s
economic environment reflects the goals and transaction costs of legislators, interested
constituents, and the holders of residual interests.
The abuse of sovereign discretion may take several forms. A nation might depart
from the goal that justifies the existence of its discretion in economic development,
possibly exploiting individuals for the benefit of various organized groups. A nation
might also export costs to, or import benefits from, other nations.
To limit such abuse, the Article turned to standards and limitations to define the
institutional competence of nations. Among other constraints, the Article discussed
standards of neutrality for legislation and limitations on subsidies, in both cases drawing
on our experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The Article also proposed three norms of international law that would limit a
nation’s discretion to design its tax code. First, a nation would have exclusive
prescriptive jurisdiction over the income derived from business operations conducted
within its territory. Second, a nation would have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over
portfolio income derived anywhere in the world from capital accumulated within its
territory. Third, a nation’s tax code must be transparent to the tax authorities of other
nations when the nation acts as a conduit for portfolio investment. These primary norms
of international tax law would be subject to permissible anti-abuse regimes and the
secondary norms mentioned below.
The three primary norms are based on the value to global economic development
of capital formation, a variety of approaches to the design of national economic
environments, including the size of a nation’s public sector, and of sovereign
competition. It is only through the comparison of different economic environments that
we may determine the effect of different institutional arrangements on economic
performance. Global economic development must take into account adaptive efficiency
as well as allocative efficiency. As a species of allocative efficiency, the traditional tax
policy of capital export neutrality is subordinate to the economic design of institutions
that promote the well-being of the world’s people.
Furthermore, to gain the full benefit of decentralized decision-making among the
world’s nations, we must preserve incentives for national decision-makers to be attentive
to the design of a nation’s economic environment and to capital formation within that
environment. Chief among those incentives is the tax revenue generated by an economic
environment and by capital formation.
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These limitations suggest that a national tax code consist of an exemption system
for the business income of residents, source-based taxation of nonresidents of their
business income from permanent establishments, a worldwide system for portfolio
income derived from capital accumulated within the nation’s economic environment, a
conditional absence of taxation of nonresidents’ portfolio income derived from capital
accumulated elsewhere, an anti-abuse regime similar to today’s anti-deferral regimes, and
a conditional exchange of tax information with other nations. Neither a foreign tax credit
nor a preferential tax regime should be included in a national income tax code. A nation
would be free to set its tax rate at whatever level it determines best for economic
development, subject to the constraints of international capital markets and sovereign
competition.
The Article then addressed collective action problems among sovereign decisionmakers. Anti-abuse regimes are one method of coordinating collective action. Those
regimes deter tax evasion by enterprises attempting to make only phantom choices among
national economic environments for their business operations or place of residence.
Treaties are a second method of coordinating collective action. Tax treaties facilitate the
movement of nations toward the primary norms of international taxation.
The primary norms of international taxation are the international equivalent of
social norms. To the extent these norms are not self-enforcing, we must devise secondary
social norms for their enforcement. Those secondary norms would be embodied in
national tax codes, bilateral tax treaties, or a multinational tax treaty.
The Article proposes three secondary norms of international taxation. First, a
nation may tax currently a resident’s business income derived under another nation’s
preferential tax regime or, as an alternative, may impose measured import duties on
products and services produced under a preferential tax regime. Second, a nation may
impose a conditional and substantial withholding tax on portfolio income paid to
residents of a particular nation. Third, a nation may suspend its exchange of tax
information with a particular nation. A nation would be able to pursue the second and
third norms either in response to another nation’s residence-based taxation of business
income or in response to another nation’s taxation of nonresidents’ portfolio income.
A multilateral tax treaty is required to define the primary and secondary norms, to
resolve disputes about possible violations of the norms, and to authorize the imposition of
secondary norms as measured retaliation for violations of primary norms. Such a treaty
would bear similarities to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and could be
incorporated into the body of agreements administered by the World Trade Organization.
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